On the economics of interpersonal relationships: three essays on social capital, social norms and social identity by Herbaux, Denis
Faculté des Sciences sociales et politiques/ 
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management 
 
Année Académique 2009 - 2010 
Thèse de doctorat présentée en vue de l’obtention du titre de  
Docteur en sciences économiques et de gestion 
On the Economics of Interpersonal Relationships: 
Three Essays on Social Capital, Social Norms, and 
Social Identity 
 
Denis HERBAUX 
Directeur:    Professeur Mathias DEWATRIPONT - Université Libre de Bruxelles 
Co-directeur:   Professeur Georg KIRCHSTEIGER - Université Libre de Bruxelles 
Membres du jury:  Professeur Micael CASTANHEIRA - Université Libre de Bruxelles 
    Professeur Jean-Luc DE MEULEMEESTER - Université Libre de Bruxelles 
    Professeur Jan POTTERS - Tilburg University 
Remerciements
Lorsque jai débuté ma thèse de doctorat, plus dun ma dit que ce travail serait long,
di¢ cile, et parfois solitaire. Quatre ans plus tard, je dois en e¤et reconnaître que cette
description est assez proche de la réalité. Heureusement, au cours de toutes ces années
passées à lULB, jai eu lopportunité de rencontrer de nombreuses personnes qui ont non
seulement permis à mon travail daboutir, mais aussi, et surtout, qui ont fait de cette période
un moment qui restera gravé dans ma mémoire.
Je souhaite évidemment commencer mes remerciements par mes deux co-directeurs: Math-
ias et Georg. Sans votre aide, cette thèse naurait probablement jamais vu le jour. Merci
pour le temps que vous mavez consacré, vos commentaires et vos conseils. Je noublierai
probablement jamais le bic rouge de Georg, et les "sounds good" de Mathias. Encore une
fois, merci.
Merci également aux autres membres de mon jury: Jan Potters (merci davoir accepté
dêtre dans mon jury, ainsi que de mavoir accueilli à Tilburg), Jean-Luc De Meulemeester,
et Micael Castanheira. Petite parenthèse sur Micael, non seulement membre de mon jury,
mais qui a également été mon chef de service pendant quelques années: il est probablement
lhomme qui parle le plus au monde, mais il est également une des personnes les plus gentilles
que jai rencontrées, toujours prêt à aider, que ce soit pour la thèse, ou pour nimporte quoi
dautre.
Merci aussi à tous les professeurs que jai eu loccasion de rencontrer, ainsi quaux doc-
torants avec qui jai passé du temps, que ce soit pour la recherche, le midi à la Sodexho
ou à lAtelier le vendredi soir. Sans oublier le personnel administratif avec qui jai travaillé
pendant six ans et qui ma rendu la vie bien plus facile. Enn, merci à tous mes collègues
des di¤érents conseils, et en particulier à ceux du conseil dadministration de lULB pour les
deux années passées ensemble. Longue vie au LAMA!
Ecrire cette thèse ma fait réaliser combien la famille et les amis sont importants dans
1
les moments di¢ ciles. Je tiens à remercier mes parents, pour mavoir guidé et aidé pen-
dant de nombreuses années et pour mavoir soutenu dans cette dernière étape, mon frère
Yannick, et Carol, ma grand-mère, ainsi que Florence et toute ma belle-famille pour leurs
encouragements. Je tiens également à remercier Auriane et Thomas, mes amis de toujours,
Raphaël, Carole, Gaëlle et JP, Virginie, Nicolas, Christine, Stéphanie, Ludovic, Serge, tous
les membres de ma troupe de théâtre, et bien entendu, les opossums!
Enn, je terminerai en remerciant quelques personnes dont jai été plus proche à luniversité,
et qui mont, dune manière ou dune autre, aidé ou soutenu dans la réalisation de ma thèse.
Merci à Joëlle et Quentin, les anciens du service de mathématique.
Merci à mes confrères du DEA: Fred (appelé aussi rocket man par un certain Johnny
Clegg) et Laurent (qui est probablement la seule personne au monde capable de vous expliquer
lanecdote sur Mas-Collel/Green).
Merci à Catherine et Vincenzo pour leur aide précieuse dans la partie empirique de ma
thèse, mais aussi pour tous les moments que nous avons partagés, de Disneyland au KafKaf.
Merci à Elena. Il y a des rencontres dans une vie qui sont plus importantes que dautres.
Tu fais partie de ces rencontres. Merci pour les fous rires, les crises dangoisse, les jeux
politiques et la complicité. Tu es une des raisons qui font que je ne regrette pas dêtre passé
par ici. Jespère que la distance ne changera rien.
Merci à Nicky, pour les nombreuses discussions, laide inconditionnelle, le soutien moral,
les délires, le "sport" et les ordinateurs. Cette thèse ne serait sans doute pas ce quelle est si
tu navais pas été là. Merci pour tout, mais surtout, merci dêtre devenu un ami.
Merci à Marjorie. Je pourrais te remercier, comme beaucoup, pour langlais. Cela serait
tout à fait exact, mais fort commun et réducteur. Je pourrais également te remercier pour le
café du matin et les potins divers et variés, ainsi que pour toutes les médisances que lon a
dites, et celles qui restent à venir. Je pourrais aussi te remercier pour mavoir engagé comme
assistant, puis pour mavoir suggéré de postuler au FNRS. Et je pourrais évidemment te
2
remercier pour tes encouragements, ton soutien et ton aide. Mais je veux surtout te remercier
de faire partie de ma vie.
Et bien sûr, merci à Ariane pour mavoir supporté et soutenu pendant cinq ans, merci
pour tout ce quon a vécu, et tout ce qui nous reste à vivre, merci davoir connu Hans Zimmer,
merci dêtre tout ce que jai toujours rêvé. Merci pour tout. PPP
3
Contents
I Introduction 8
II The Tyranny of Social Norms on Individual Behavior 18
1 Introduction 19
2 From social capital to group behavior 21
3 The model 26
3.1 The setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 The Enforced Consumption Game (ECG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 The Peer Pressure Game (PPG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.1 Individual behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.2 Welfare and social optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.3 Segregation as welfare maximizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 State intervention and Pareto improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Conclusion 45
Appendices 50
A Proofs 50
A.1 Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.2 Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.3 Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.4 Lemma 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.5 Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.6 Lemma 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.7 Lemma 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4
A.8 Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.9 Proposition 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B Computation 66
B.1 Utility in ECG when nobody moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
B.2 Utility at the optimum in the PPG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B.3 Useful Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
B.4 Utility when nobody moves in the PPG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B.5 Utility when one side moves: lB + lA > 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.6 Utility when one side moves: lB + lA < 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.7 Full Segregation function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.8 Half Segregation function (<1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
B.9 Full rather than Half function (<1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
III Social Identity, Advertising and Market Competition 72
1 Introduction 73
2 Setup of the model 79
3 A model of Social Identity 81
3.1 Two groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Three groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4 Social Identity, Advertising and Market Competition 86
4.1 One rm advertises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.1.1 If a = ; and b = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.1.2 If a = ; and b = 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.1.3 Firm Bs optimal strategy if A does not advertise . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Both rms advertise using di¤erent targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5
4.2.1 If a = 12 and b = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.2 If a = 1 and b = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.3 If a = 1 and b = 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Both rms advertise using the same target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4 Equilibrium behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5 Consumer welfare implications 99
5.1 Aggregate consumer welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Individual consumer welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6 Conclusion 103
Appendices 107
A Proofs 107
A.1 Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.2 Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.3 Lemma 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
IV Social Capital in Belgium 110
1 Introduction 111
2 What is Social Capital ? 112
3 Measuring Social Capital 114
3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.2 Index of social capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4 Belgians Regional Di¤erences in Social Capital 120
5 Regional di¤erences in Europe? 127
6
6 Conclusion 131
7
Part I
Introduction
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In 2004, M. Night Shyamalan directed a movie entitled "The Village" that tells the story of
a community living outside of the real world without even knowing of the existence of any
other life. The community works with very strong values and norms. All of its members live
just as in the past, before electricity, running water or modern medecine. They all dress in
an old fashioned way, red is a forbidden color, and "Those We Do Not Speak Of" cannot be
disturbed or attracted.
The movie describes a situation in which a community works as a closed network, sharing
norms, values, habits, in which inhabitants trust each other and deviants from the norms are
easily punished. While this is a bit extreme, similar situations are nonetheless observed in
everyday life. When trying to incorporate these facts into the neoclassical approach, one faces
major di¢ culties, since interpersonal relationships are not really taken into account. These
di¢ culties are mainly due to the di¤erences between economics and sociology as outlined by
Duesenberry (1960):
"Economics is all about choice, while sociology is about why people have no
choices."
The idea behind this is that for decades, economic theories have been mostly based on the
rational choices made by selsh individuals to maximize their utility, while sociology spent a
lot of e¤ort describing the environment of individuals and explaining how this environment
shapes their decisions. During the last thirty years, many new concepts have appeared in
the economic literature. For example, behavioral economics has introduced features such as
envy or altruism into traditional theories. Other notions such as social capital, social norms,
trust, community or networks have become more and more present in economic research. The
objective of this new strand of literature is to engage into a sort of socioeconomic approach
and to shed some light on interpersonal relationships. As outlined by Akerlof (1997):
"[...] the impact of my choices on my interactions with other members of my
social network may be the primary determinant of my decision [...]"
The main objective of this thesis is to go further into this socioeconomic analysis, ap-
plying existing sociological concepts to classical economic models. In particular, we will use
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interpersonal relationships as a recurrent theme throughout the thesis, the nal goal being
to try to answer the following question:
Do interpersonal relationships matter?
This general question is investigated by way of three more specic ones, each of which
examines a particular approach to the topic. A rst step consists in evaluating the utility
of interpersonal relationships. In particular, we argue that interpersonal relationships may
be used to explain some phenomena that are observed in everyday life. Although similar
investigations have already been conducted, we use a particular approach based on norms
and communities, two concepts linked to interpersonal relationships, to study
How social norms constrain individual consumption.
In a second step, we explore the potential e¤ect of interpersonal relationships based on
the existence of social identity, i.e. the fact that individuals want others to know who they
are. The question investigated is the following:
What is the impact of social identity on the market equilibrium?
In the last step, we describe interpersonal relationships through a highly popular concept
in economics, social capital, which can be seen as a specic form of interpersonal relationships.
We study what social capital is made of in Belgium, in terms of its level and composition.
More precisely, we are interested in the following point:
Are there any regional di¤erences in the levels of social capital in Belgium?
Together, these three parts should help us to gain a better understanding of what inter-
personal relationships are, what their utility is, and what their impact is on the results of
classical economic models. Answering the questions raised above is useful, notably in terms
of policy implications. As already noted, interpersonal relationships are a reality, an aspect
which cannot be neglected when designing policies to improve specic economic situations.
Let us now present more precisely what each part of the thesis is made of.
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One way of interpreting the introductory example is to say that it portrays a type of
group behavior. Again, even if the example is quite extreme, there exist many other examples
of group behavior: risky behavior by adolescents, religious behavior, dress code inside some
communities, success or failure in education, consumption of a given product, are all examples
of group behavior which seem quite evident to most people.
In the rst paper, The Tyranny of Social Norms on Individual Behavior, we
assume, based on social capital theories, that group behavior arises because of the existence
of a norm inside a community and that negative outcomes may appear because of a potential
high cost of moving. We use a particular denition of social capital, allowing us to introduce
the concepts of communities and norms in a theory studying the dark side of interpersonal
relationships. The idea is the following: by living in the same community, agents share
interpersonal relationships, in particular under the form of social capital, and social assets
such as values, codes, hobbies, etc. that are shared by all members. Suppose that a norm
exists (for example a consumption norm) inside the community. If an agent does not want
to consume the norm, given the possibilities of sanctions inside a community, he has to move
to another community. But this has a cost, in the sense that the agent has to invest in new
social assets to be accepted in the new community he wishes to enter. Obviously, the more
di¤erent the two communities, the more costly it is to change communities.
Consider for example someone born in a very religious environment. Let us call him
Christian. His parents are deep believers and the entire family goes to church four times a
week. Christian goes to a religious school, so his friends are mostly believers. Let us consider
that at the age of 15, Christian realizes that he does not believe in God as much as the others,
and hence wants to change his "religious consumption". If he does it while staying in his
original community, he will have to bear the social shame of his parents, his friends, and the
whole community. Moreover, access to resources from the network will be harder (nding a
job, getting a table at a restaurant, ...). Christian will have to consider di¤erent possibilities:
either he is prepared to bear these costs, or he accepts to "stay with God", meaning that
he keeps the same "religious consumption", although he does not get any utility from it (in
11
fact, he gets a disutility). Of course, he may choose to change communities, but this has a
cost to create new social capital, which can be seen as an investment in social assets: time
to create new relationships, training in some activities practiced in the new group, buying
new clothes to t to the group, ... If the cost of moving is too high, and prevents him from
running away, if the deviation cost is also high, social capital (a specic form of interpersonal
relationships) may have a negative e¤ect on his well being.
Our model investigates to what extent it is possible to replace social segregation, in-
strumented here by social assets, by a segregation in types, thereby allowing consumers to
choose what they want. We use a model with two types of agents, two communities and an
endogenous norm which is dened as the average of types inside a community. Because of
social sanctions, agents are forced to consume something between what they would like to
consume and what the norm tells them to consume. Hence, the norm exerts a burden on
agents. We allow for the possibility of moving to another community, conditioned on invest-
ment in social assets. Depending on the size of this investment, we nd that the di¤erent
kinds of equilibria may arise. We may end up in an equilibrium in which there is only one
type in each community, both types in each community, or one type in one community and
both types in the other community. This means that there are cases in which consumers
cannot break the social segregation on their own. Of course, these various equilibria have
di¤erent e¤ects in terms of welfare. We outline that some of these equilibria are suboptimal,
in the sense that agents do not individually take the decision to move, though moving would
be socially optimal, and that State intervention may help to reach an optimal equilibrium.
Unfortunately, there are also cases in which it is too costly, even with State intervention, for
people to change communities. In these situations, agents remain stuck in their community,
forced to live with the burden of the norm.
As already said above, there are many examples of group behavior. Here is another:
children living in a fancy neighborhood can often be recognized by the way they look: they
usually wear the same expensive brand of clothes, Tommy Hilger or Scapa for example.
They also share a series of specic behaviors and of social assets such as being capable of
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playing tennis, knowing the language to use and the behavior to have at a party, ... This
example ts the previous setup. However, maybe a better way to explain this particular
group behavior is to consider clothes not as a norm, but rather as a signal. The idea would
then be that someone chooses a particular type of clothes in order to signal to others that he
is part of a specic community. Individuals may do this for at least two reasons. First, they
may do it to be accepted by a group, even if their type is in fact not the same as the type of
the community. In that case, agents pretend to be something they are not in order to benet
from the community. Another reason is because agents like to be well understood by others,
that is, they like others recognize their type by the signal they send. The second paper
considers the latter by studying consumption behavior in the presence of social identity.
In this paper, Social Identity, Advertising, and Market Competition, we introduce
the concept of social identity. Social identity is a sociological concept which basically states
that consumption, besides its traditional role of satisfying needs, is used by people to signal
their identity, i.e. type, to others. The underlying idea is that individuals tend to categorize
others and to be caterogized. Following social identity, consumers want to be correctly
categorized. As a consequence, agents get more utility if their type is understood correctly
by others. For this, an agent will choose a good which will communicate his type to others.
We introduce this theory into the classical Bertrand price competition framework, and analyze
what the e¤ects are on both consumer and rm behavior. Our model assumes a continuum
of types and two rms, each producing an undi¤erentiated good (at least when there is no
social identity and no advertising). Taking social identity into account has two consequences:
rst, if the number of goods is limited, it generates the formation of groups in the population,
corresponding to a partitioning of types. Second, this creates market power for rms, leading
to higher prices and prots. If there is coordination failure, then social identity generates
multiple equilibria, each of which corresponds to a particular partition of agents.
One way this can be solved is by adding advertising to the model. Advertising is usually
used by rms either to communicate the existence of the product (informative advertising) or
to persuade consumers to buy the product (persuasive advertising). In our model, advertising
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is seen as in the persuasive view as well as in the complementary view, that is, the fact that
consuming a good which is advertised provides utility. However, this utility decreases with the
distance between a consumers type and the advertising target, the idea being that someone
does not like to consume a good which is targeted on a very di¤erent type than his own.
With advertising, agents can now coordinate on specic equilibria. However, this also leads to
more market power for rms, meaning higher prices and prots. Beyond the trivial equilibria
in which both rms advertise, or neither rm does, depending on the advertising cost and
the taste for advertising, our model also generates multiple equilibria, as well as asymmetric
equilibria. Such asymmetric equilibria are characterized by one rm whose advertising target
is the average type, while the other rm is seen as producing a "no brand" product. The
equilibria that arise depend on the result of the combination of three e¤ects. Since two rms
compete for market shares, the rst e¤ect is what we called the competition e¤ect, which
basically leads rms to decrease their prices to win market shares. The way the continuum
is divided into subsets has an impact on this e¤ect since it more or less exposes rms to
competition. The second e¤ect is created by advertising, and the fact that consumers value
it. It is called the market stealing e¤ect which allows a rm that advertises to steal market
shares from the other rm, thanks to the consumers taste for advertising. Finally, the
presence of social identity and advertising decreases price elasticity, leading to higher prices.
This is the third e¤ect that plays a role in which equilibria arise. We also show that in terms
of aggregate consumer welfare, the optimal number of rms which advertise depends on the
consumerstaste for advertising.
In the last paper, Social Capital in Belgium, we describe a specic kind of interpersonal
interactions, i.e. social capital, using Belgium as a case study. More precisely, we characterize
empirically what social capital is made of in Belgium and if there exist any regional di¤erences
in terms of levels of social capital. In the literature, all of the elements of the introductory
example describing "The Village" are used (sometimes together, sometimes separately) to
dene the concept social capital. This concept was introduced almost thirty years ago, and
has been used to explain a huge range of economic phenomena. In the paper, we start by
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underlining that there exist many denitions of social capital, from those considered to be
the rst (Loury 1977, and Coleman 1988) to the most recent ones (Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2005). In all of these denitions, elements such as norms, trust, networks, communities, civic
behavior, etc. can be found.
Using the last wave of the European Social Survey, we develop an index of social capital
from various questions available in the survey using principal component analysis. The
questions are selected on the basis of the fact that they must instrument one or more elements
proposed by the most frequently used denitions of social capital. The idea is to avoid
restricting ourselves to a particular denition. On top of the created index of social capital,
this methodology allows us to characterize three aspects which compose social capital: Trust,
which is one of the most popular measures of social capital, Social Activities, which are
interpreted as a way for individuals to regroup with others to achieve common goals, as
well as a measure of civic behavior, and Social Networks, which is seen as a way to pursue
purposive actions. Using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and some control variables, we show
that there exist regional di¤erences (Flanders has the highest level of social capital), and
that education is an important variable in the formation of social capital. We also perform
2SLS on each aspect of social capital, and we nd that education is still signicant, and that
regional di¤erences are still present, except for Social Activities.
Finally, we extend the analysis to other European countries. We show that countries can
be divided into groups on the basis of their social capital. Another result is that regional
di¤erences in social capital can be found in many Western European countries. Among these
countries, Switzerland seems to have the highest regional di¤erences in terms of social capital,
while Ireland has no regional di¤erences. Austria, The Netherlands and France have similar
proles. Concerning Belgium, the level of regional di¤erences is higher than in Austria, The
Netherlands and France, but lower than in Switzerland.
As stated at the beginning of this introduction, the main goal of the thesis is to show
that interpersonal relationships do matter. Of course, interpersonal relationships mean many
things, and it is not possible to cover everything in one go. We therefore restrict ourselves
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to three narrower topics, each one an aspect of interpersonal relationships. In each chapter,
we try to answer a question that either has not been studied in the literature or to study an
existing question in an original way.
The rst paper examines at norms and communities, starting from the social capital
literature. The goal here is to explain why some people in a community must consume a
good that they do not like because the rest of the community does so. Although group
behavior has been widely studied from role models to segregation models, we bring new
aspects to the existing literature. First, we develop a framework using many concept drawn
from the socioeconomic literature, trying to clarify how these aspects are related to each
other and how they can be used together to explain how enforced consumption arises in
a community. Second, we built a simple model describing such a situation, allowing us to
determine under which conditions the State can intervene to resolve social segregation when
agents cannot do it individually. Hence, this paper also has possible policy implications. It
is therefore important to take into account such interpersonal relationships if policies are to
be e¤ective.
In the second paper, we introduce social identity in the classical Bertrand price com-
petition model. Our main contributions here are the following: rst, the concept of social
identity has almost never been used in economics. Second, we show that taking interpersonal
relationships into account modies classical results drastically, since it creates market power
for rms. Third, we show that advertising, while allowing consumers to coordinate on specic
equilibria, again increases market power for rms.
Finally, in the last paper, we describe a specic form of interpersonal relationships: social
capital. Although such a description has already been carried out before, it is the rst time
that a study concentrates on Belgium, and more precisely on regional di¤erences in the levels
of social capital. Although this rst paper is mainly descriptive, it presents interesting results
in terms of the composition of social capital, as well as regional di¤erences in Belgium and
in other countries of Western Europe.
Throughout all three papers, we put forward what can be understood by interpersonal
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relationships and how important they are. By doing this, although there is still a great
deal of work to be done, we hope to get a little closer to the full understanding of the
socioeconomicus.
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Part II
The Tyranny of Social Norms on
Individual Behavior
18
1 Introduction
Although this may sound like a cliché, people are not equal with respect to access to and
success in higher education. Indeed, individual characteristics of successful students in uni-
versities tend to converge: students who come from some "good" neighborhoods and students
whose parents are more educated tend to be more present and more successful in university
populations. This suggets the existence of neighborhoods which do not invest in education.
The question is then to nd out what reasons, other than money, can explain such group
behavior. One possible explanation lies in the theory of social capital: by growing and living
in a given neighborhood, an agent builds a number of interpersonal relationships such as
family of course, but also friends, colleagues, neighbors, etc. Because they live together, one
can easily imagine that all of these people share similar characteristics, such as the music
they listen to, the way they dress and speak, their hobbies and evening activities, etc. In
fact, these similarities create the identity of the community, ensuring that the group is more
or less homogenous with respect to these characteristics. However, this does not mean that
an agents preferences t those of the group perfectly. In particular, it is possible that one
member of the group might want to invest in education while nobody else in the group wants
to do so. Should he decide to make this investment this person would turn into an outsider,
implying in turn that the agent would have to bear a high psychological (social shame) as
well as physical (aggression) or even monetary (since he is excluded from the community, he
can no longer benet from the resources of that community) cost. Moreover, to be able to
enter into a new group (the educated one), it is necessary to invest in order to gain the same
characteristics as the others. Hence, an individual facing this situation must make a choice
between three possibilities: rst, he may decide to follow the norm (not get educated) and
then su¤er from a loss in terms of utility. Second, he may change communities (which requires
an investment). Finally, he may choose something between the norm and ideal consumption,
i.e. to stay in his original community, but bearing the cost of deviation. Since the cost of
deviation and the cost of investment can be quite high, this may end in a "no deviation
from the equilibrium (no education)" dominant strategy. Note that we do not consider the
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peer group here as having an impact on some endogenous preferences but rather as exerting
pressure leading to a constraint.
This example clearly shows that belonging to a given community may a¤ect agents nega-
tively (other examples could be risky behavior by adolescents, such as drinking alcohol, taking
drugs or religious extremism). Even if this negative aspect of interpersonal relationships is
somewhat intuitive, it is not often investigated in the social capital literature. Indeed, though
the last thirty years have seen many new concepts appear in the economic literature (social
capital, social norms, endogenous preferences, community and networks) with the objective
of engaging into a sort of socioeconomic approach and to shed some light on interpersonal
relationships, most of the time authors consider social relations as improving economic sit-
uations. Without denying this important aspect, in this paper we focus on the dark side of
interpersonal relationships. We truly believe that lling this gap in the literature is relevant,
in particular as far as economic policy is concerned: one cannot expect any policy to be fully
e¢ cient if all forces at play (both positive and negative) have not been fully investigated.
In order to study the negative side of interpersonal relationships, we develop a model of
communitiesbehavior with an endogenous norm based on the social capital literature. We
show that in order to see a "moving" behavior arise, the degree of segregation between the two
communities must be su¢ ciently high with respect to the moving cost. Key results are that
the type of equilibrium depends crucially on the distribution of types accross communities as
well as on the size of the moving cost. Moreover, we stress that socially suboptimal equilibria
may arise, and that these equilibria may be corrected by State intervention through transfers
to nance the inter community mobility. Unfortunately, we also show that in some cases,
the State cannot intervene, so people remain stuck in their original community, thus forced
to consume something di¤erent than their idal consumption. In that case, social segregation
cannot be replaced by a segregation by types.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a short review of the literature,
shedding some light on the link between social capital and group behavior. In section 3, we
propose our model of communitiesbehavior. Section 4 concludes.
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2 From social capital to group behavior
One of the main goals of this paper is to understand how agents can be harmed by belonging
to a group in which they are forced to consume the same good as other members, without
having the possibility to move. One consequence of this is the existence of similar behavior.
Similarities of behavior can be explained in many ways. The presence of externalities when
consuming the same good, the presence of information channels, or a taste for conformity can
be potential answers. Focusing on a specic community or group, Manski (2000) states that
people in the same group tend to behave similarly. Moreover, Postlewaite (1998) argues that
the individuals choice problem is a¤ected by the social group. Among the social processes
that create group behavior, let us mention "conspicuous consumption" as in the Veblen
e¤ect, which states that the intrinsic value of a product may be less important than its social
meaning, and "keeping up with the Joneses", where utility of consumption depends on the
absolute level of consumption but also on how much is consumed in comparison to others
(Janssen and Jager, 2001). Many empirical studies have been carried out in order to study
such behavior. For example, Lachance and al. (2003) study the role of three socialization
agents, namely parents, peers, and TV on adolescentsbrand sensitivity. They nd that
peers seem to be the most important. Grinblatt and al. (2004) analyze the automobile
purchase behavior in two Finnish provinces. It seems that a consumers purchases are strongly
inuenced by the neighbors, information sharing being the key determinant. More negative
relationships have also been studied. Phenomena such as risky behavior (Case and Katz,
1991; Kling and al., 2005; Clark and Lohéac, 2007), problems in education (Benabou, 1996;
Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005) or criminal activities (Glaeser et al.,
1996; Donohue and Levitt, 2001) have been investigated and various explanations have been
proposed by the above-mentioned authors and some other, to explain the exitence of these
phenomena inside groups. The contagion model, the role model and the peer e¤ect model
state that the environment of an agent inuences or shapes his preferences. Hence, in these
models, agents adopt a given behavior because of their peferences. For example, children who
grow up in a family or a neighborhood in which crime or use of drugs is highly present are
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more likely to develop the same behavior. In institutional theories, agentsbehavior depends
on institutions such as school, social services, police, etc. For example, someone living in a
neighbohood with only bad schools will rarely be able to reach a high education level. Hence,
consumption choices are constrained by the environment. A third possibility is segregation
and discrimination models, which explain why and how people with similar characteristics
end up facing similar situations (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Bertrand andMullainathan, 2004).
An example of the latter is the fact that being named Emily or Greg in the United States
gives you more chances of getting a job interview than being called Lakisha or Jamal.
Our paper also concentrates on the negative aspect of group behavior, through the ex-
istence of norms and moving costs. For this, we base our argument on the social capital
literature.
The concept of social capital is almost thirty years old. There exist many denitions of
social capital, some rather general, others much more precise. Some of the authors who use
this concept are Loury (1977) and Coleman (1988), who are considered as being at the origin
of social capital, and Putnam (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002), Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2005). In all of the denitions, elements such as norms, trust, network, purposive action,
etc. can be found. To make our point as clear as possible, we take these various elements
and develop a theory explaining how social capital can harm people. The general idea is the
following: having social capital means sharing interpersonal relationships with others, which
is of course the case in communities. Inside such communities, agents may behave similarly,
one reason for this being the existence of a norm. If one individual does not want to follow
that norm, he will have to invest in social assets, allowing him to develop new social capital
and enter into a new community.
To develop our argument, we rely on a denition by Lin (1999) which states that:
"social capital can be dened as resources embedded in a social structure which
are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions"
In this view, trust and norms are not seen as being social capital, but rather as social
assets used to create it. This narrower denition is coherent with that of Sobel (2002) in
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which individuals can use membership in groups and networks to secure benets. For the
remainder of the paper, we rely on a denition inspired by both Lin and Sobel. Before
dening our vision of social capital, we need to clarify the notion of social asset.
Denition 1 A social asset is an asset that gets its (additional) value because it is used in
a social context.
This denition follows that of Mailath and Postelwaite (2006). Let us illustrate it by
some examples: learning the values of a group is an investment in a social asset, because
this asset (knowledge of values) will generate returns once it is used in contact with others.
Another example is "golf knowledge", which can be seen as a "normal" asset (playing as a
hobby) or as a social asset (since I can play golf, I will be able to play with my boss and get
promoted more easily). It is important to note that social assets may be acquired through
investment (I want to have this asset, so I am investing to acquire it), inheritance (nobility
for example) or willingness of the parents (education or values for example). We can now
give our denition of social capital.
Denition 2 Social Capital is an amount of interpersonal relationships, created using social
assets, and which can be used in purposive actions.
Using this more precise denition has two major advantages: rst, it allows the reader
to have a clear idea of what we mean when we use the term social capital. Second, using a
separation between the investment and the result makes the modelling and the understanding
of social phenomenum such as the one we describe in this paper easier.
In most cases, social capital is used to correct ine¢ ciencies due to some coordination
failure or imperfect information. For example, asymmetric information about the quality
of a worker can be (partially) solved if the worker and the owner of the rm know each
other through a common network. Another example is that it is easier and cheaper to
trade with someone you trust than with someone unknown (because the explicit contract is
partially replaced by an implicit one). Portes (1998) identies three basic functions of social
capital: family support, social control, and benets through extrafamilial networks. The rst
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function has to do with the role of parents in education achievements (see Coleman, 1988) or
preventing risky behavior, while the second deals with maintaining discipline and promoting
cooperation (as explained by Bowles and Gintis, 2002). The third one seems to be the most
studied in the literature, and is the main argument of Granovetter (1973). Although Portes
makes networks explicit only for the third function, we already underlined that all of them
rely (at least partially) on the existence of networks. We then need to characterize more
precisely what networks are about.
In fact, the concept of network is relatively close to that of community. More precisely,
one can view a community as a network subject to more conditions than only interpersonal
relationships. One way of viewing a community is to consider that being part of a community
requires having some common characteristics, which can be instrumentalized by social assets.
We can then dene a community in the following way:
Denition 3 A community is a network of individuals, with a common basis of social assets
(including values and norms), who share interpersonal relationships.
Since social capital is often linked to the concept of community, we will focus on it. In the
literature, the term community is used to describe how people interact in their daily lives,
in families, in the neighborhood, and in work groups, not just as buyers, sellers, and citizens
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Following these authors, being part of a community can have
numerous advantages and increase welfare: for example, associations of neighbors to prevent
crime and promote education, or shermen who share income, information and training.
The main justication is that repeated interactions, which are consequences of being part
of a community, may prevent from things like free riding, and social sanctions following a
deviation may be much more harmful than legal sanctions. One feature often encountered
in communities is social norms. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) outlined that "we still know
little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content and [...] the
requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms". However, some
research has been undertaken to determine what a norm is and why people obey norms.
Elster (1989) describes di¤erent kinds of norms that may exist. Among them are, on the one
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hand, consumption norms which, besides the traditional consumption goods, include things
like dress code and table manners, and on the other hand cultural behavior, such as syntax,
vocabulary and pronunciation, and even movies, books, sports... People obey norms in order
to avoid sanctions or disapproval of other people. For sociologists (see Elster, 1989), actions of
agents can be inuenced by rationality, social norms or a compromise between both. However,
economists do not share this view. Indeed, they rather consider that agents maximize utility
under constraints, following what they call rationality. In other words, conforming to the
norm does not mean irrationality. Moreover, since there is a cost of deviation from the norm,
in terms of loss in reputation involving a loss in utility, people may be happy to conform to
the established norm (Akerlof, 1980). Even if we still do not know (exactly) how norms are
formed (tradition or construction), we do know that possibility of punishment is a way to
maintain the norm (this has been tested empirically, see Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), and
this is done best inside a community, thanks to repeated interactions1.
This allows us to state our point: inside a community, agents share interpersonal rela-
tionships, in the form of social capital, and interact repeatedly. If a norm exists inside such a
community, then deviants are easily recognized and punished, which leads to the sustainablity
of a norm. If someone wants to escape from a norm, he may have to change communities,
requiring then to invest in social assets in order to create new social capital. The negative
e¤ect of interpersonal relationships arises precisely there: social capital (or at least the non
transferable part of it) imposes a cost on agents who want to move (through the investment
in social assets needed to enter the new community), which may lead to the fact that agents
do not move in the end, even if consuming the norm of a group is not their rst choice.
The process of moving is to a certain extent similar to what is described by Tiebout
(1956), but also to the literature on club theory and group formation. In the Tiebout model,
agents move to the jurisdiction in which the tax-public good package is the closest to their
preferences, thereby creating homogenous jurisdictions. Although the underlying mechanism
of our model is clearly linked to that of Tiebout, there are many di¤erences: the consump-
1A question which remains open is to nd out whether the community imposes a norm to agents who
belong to the group, or whether it is the fact that agents share a given norm that creates the community.
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tion norm is endogenous, we include the moving cost in the analysis, described here as the
investment in social assets needed to enter into a new community, we describe the social
environment of the agents and the type of good is not a public good, but can rather be re-
ferred to as private consumption. Concerning club theory (Buchanan, 1965), this essentially
says that agents form clubs on a voluntary basis in order to lower the cost of production of
an unpure public good, while enjoying its consumption. In our case, agents inside a com-
munity do not get together for joint production, but are forced to consume a joint norm.
Hence, the community (the club) does not do something for me, but rather, prescribes or
proscribes my consumption patterns2. Finally, our model is close to the literature on group
formation. In this literature, there are two main reasons for group formation: either because
individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them (Milchtaich and Winter, 2002),
or because individuals prefer to associate with people making the same choice (Karni and
Schmeidler, 1990). Our model combines both aspects: agents try to get into the community
in which the norm is the closest to their type, meaning that the majority of people is similar
to them. However, this taste for similarity does not appear directly in the utility function
but indirectly through the norm and how it is dened.
3 The model
This section is organized as follows: subsection 3.1 describes the setup of the model. Subsec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3 analyze two di¤erent games: the rst game considers a case in which agents
must consume the norm of the community they belong to, while the second game allows for
a consumption located between the norm and the "ideal consumption", i.e. the consumption
witout social constraints. In each game, we study the various possible equilibria as well as
welfare. In particular, we investigate whether the individual decision is socially optimal or
not. Finally, subsection 3.4 studies the possibility for the State to intervene in order to solve
2Note that a community can be seen as providing benets to its members. In that setting, the norm
could be seen as a necessary cost to enjoy these benets. However, in this paper, we concentrate on the
norm and on the moving cost, and not on the communitys benets. This can be justied by saying that all
communities generate the same benets, so agents do not take them into account.
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the socially suboptimal cases.
3.1 The setup
We consider an economy with n agents who are either of low (l) or high (h) type. There
are nl (nl 6= 0) agents of type l and nh (nh 6= 0) agents of type h, with nh + nl = n. The
economy is divided into two groups: A and B. There are nA agents in group A and nB
agents in group B, with nA + nB = n. We dene nik as the number of type i in group k
(i 2 fl; hg ; k 2 fA;Bg) with nk =
P
i
nik and ni =
P
k
nik.
An agent of type l (h) has preferences such that his ideal consumption (that is, without
social constraint) is given by yl (yh).
Inside each community k, a norm yk prevails, this norm being dened as the average of
the types belonging to this community. Mathematically, if ik is the proportion of i type
in group k (i 2 fl; hg ; k 2 fA;Bg), yk = lkyl + hkyh, with lk + hk = 1. Note that this
denition is based on individuals who all have the same weight in terms of inuence. Of
course, it may be the case that part of the group is more inuent than the rest. In that
case, a proportion would not be interpreted as the relative size, but as relative power (or
eventually both). This would make no real di¤erence in the analysis, so we do not take it
into account for the rest of the paper. Using a norm which is dened as an average can be
debatable. However, this seems to us to be quite natural, and to reect some kind of implicit
negotiation process having taken place inside the community. Another possibility would be
to use the median as the norm. This would be interpreted more like a majority rule in an
election. This specication appears to be just a special case of the one we use and creates
no signicative di¤erence in the results.
Agents are initially randomly distributed between the two groups, both types being
present in both communities. An agent who belongs to community k owns an amount 'k of
social assets. This amount is independent of the composition of the community, and is the
same for all agents who initially belong to a given community. In other words, agents are
initially segregated with respect to social assets and not by type (for example, someone could
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have been born in a given community in which he grows up and of which he accumulates
the social assets, but his type may be di¤erent from the type of others in the community).
An agent can then be dened by a vector composed of his social assets and his type: ('k; yi)
i 2 fl; hg ; k 2 fA;Bg. Each agent decides whether to move to the other group or not by com-
paring his utility in each group, taking into account a moving cost C. This cost is assumed to
be symmetric, in the sense that an agent located in A has to bear the same cost to go to B as
an agent located in B who wants to move to A. The moving cost in fact corresponds to social
costs, that is the investment in social assets needed to be accepted in the new community.
Hence, the moving cost is xed, but only between two given communities. Indeed, if two
communities are close in the sense that the social assets of their members are similar (vectors
'A and 'B are similar), then the cost of moving, that is the investment in social assets, is
small. On the contrary, if the two vectors are very di¤erent, meaning that there are almost
no similarities, there is a high moving cost. To be precise, we should then write the cost
as a function of two vectors of social assets C('k; 'l). However, since we consider only two
communities here, for simplicity we write C to represent the cost of moving between the two
communities. Without loss of generality, we assume that yl < yh and lA  lB. These two
last assumptions imply that yA  yB. The static game works as follows: agents compare the
utility they have with the utility that they would obtain by moving (taking into account the
moving cost) to another community, and decide whether to move or not. Hence, besides the
consumption choice, there are two possible actions aj for player j:
aj 2 fmove; not moveg :
We assume that players have a price taking behavior, they consider that their behavior has
no impact on the norm. Each agent decides to move or not given the distribution of types.
We then aim to nd a Nash equilibrium of this game, i.e. a pair
(lA; 

lB) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1]
28
such that
aj = not move 8j
The goal is of course to nd out if the equilibirum will be such that the segregation in terms
of social assets is replaced by a segregation in terms of types. For example, is it possible
that all agents who wants to get educated move to the same community, allowing them to
reach the educational level they want, without being punished by those who do not want
to get educated? Hence, in our setup, segregation of types is not seen as a negative result,
but rather as welfare maximizing. It is important to keep in mind that there is no vertical
di¤erentiation between types, that is, being a high type agent is not better than being a low
type agent. The point of the paper is to investigate under which conditions an agent can
escape from the social pressure of his community and to acquire a consumption corresponding
to his type.
3.2 The Enforced Consumption Game (ECG)
We start by analyzing agentsbehavior in the most simple possible setting in which all agents
who belong to a community are forced to consume the norm: each member of group k has to
consume the norm of the group yk. Although this case is relatively unrealistic, it will help us
to understand some features of the e¤ect of social norms on individuals. This setting can be
thought of as some kind of central authority imposing an innite cost on agents who deviate
from the norm (for example a life long prison sentence), or equivalently the authority making
the level of the norm the only available quantity of an indivisible good (in team sports for
example, in which the number of training sessions is xed and compulsory to be part of the
team).
In the ECG, the utility of an agent of type i who belongs to group k is given by
Uik =   jyi   ykj
where yi is not chosen, but corresponds to the ideal consumption of a type i. This linear
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utility function means that an agent wants to minimize the distance between the norm and
his own type. The utility of an agent is maximized when the norm is equal to his own type,
that is when only individuals of the same type are part of the community. In this setting,
having a full segregation by type is welfare maximizing. However, since the consumption
choice is reduced to consuming the norm of his community, the level of an agents utility is
constant inside a group, which does not mean that he has no decision power. Indeed, what
an agent can always choose to do is to move to another community, in order to be located
somewhere where the norm is closer to his own type, taking into account the fact that there
is a moving cost. Hence, when deciding to move or not, an agent i who belongs to group k
must compare
  jyi   ykj to  
yi   y k  C
Lemma 1 In the Enforced Consumption Game, if no group is perfectly homogenous and if
an agent of type i in k decides to move, then an agent of type  i in  k also decides to move.
Proof. See appendix.
This result is due to the functional form of the utility function. Basically, it says that
since utility is linear, agents are interested in the distance between the two norms and the
moving cost, by assumption the same for all agents. Hence, agents will decide to move if the
di¤erence between the two norms (benet of moving) is high enough compared to the cost
of moving (C). It is easy to see that only the high types of A and the low types of B may
have an incentive to move. Let us now dene an equilibrium in this game.
Denition 4 An equilibrium in the Enforced Consumption Game is a pair (lA,

lB) such
that
  yi   ikyi    iky i >   yi   i kyi    i ky i  C
8i 2 fl; hg 8k 2 fA;Bg and i belongs to k
This denition is quite intuitive. It simply states that an equilibrium is reached as soon
as nobody wants to move anymore, i.e. when the cost of moving is higher than the benet
30
of moving. Once again, we want to stress that this denition relies on the assumption that
when deciding whether to move or not, agents do not take into account the fact that if they
decide to go to the other community, the norm may be modied.
From this denition, we expect di¤erent kinds of equilibria to arise. If the two communities
are composed identically, then the norm is the same and there is no incentive to bear the
moving cost. From the point of view of the norm, it is as if the two groups were to merge
into a unique community. This is why we call this equilibrium a merging equilibrium. If,
on the other hand, the distribution of types is not the same accross groups, then the norms
are di¤erent and agents will move depending on the moving cost: if this cost is too high,
nobody moves and we have a mixed equilibrium. Finally, if we have one type of agents in
each community, then the utility of each agent is maximum and nobody wants to move: we
are in a segregating equilibrium. This can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 With moving costs, there are three possible types of equilibria:
1) Merging equilibria when lA = 

lB, with 

lk 2 (0; 1)8k 2 fA;Bg
2) A segregating equilibrium when lA = 1 and 

lB = 0
3) Mixed equilibria when lA   lB 6  
C
yl   yh
Proof. See appendix.
As can be seen from Proposition 1, the equilibrium that prevails is directly dependent on
the distribution and the moving cost. In the rst case, the distribution is the same in the two
communities, implying that the norm is the same hence agents do not want to move. In the
third case, the moving cost is too high with respect to the benet of moving, resulting in a
situation in which no community is perfectly segregated by types. Finally, in the segregating
equilibrium, there is only one type of agents in each community, implying that the norm in
each community is equal to the unique type composing this community. Hence, the utility of
each agent is maximum and nobody wants to move. In this case, the social segregation linked
to the existence of social assets and communities is replaced by a segregation in types. Note
that in a mixed equilibrium, as well as in the merging equilibrium case, social segregation
does exist.
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Two remarks have to be made at this point: rst, if there is no moving cost (C = 0),
then the mixed equilibrium disappears and either the distribution is the same, and we have a
merging equilibrium, or the distribution is not the same, and we move towards the segregating
equilibrium. Second, the ECG does not allow for any asymmetry in the decision of moving,
i.e. if one side decides to move (let say the low types agents in B), then the other side (the
high types agents in A) also moves. This is of course not very realistic, and the possibility
of asymmetry will be introduced in the next game, the Peer Pressure Game.
Proposition 2 8 (lA,lB) 2 [0; 1][0; 1], in the ECG, the aggregate level of the consumption
of y (Y ) in the economy is always the same and is equal to nlyl + nhyh:
Proof. See appendix.
From Proposition 2, the aggregate level depends only on the population of the economy,
and not on how agents are distributed between groups. This means that there are only dis-
tributional e¤ects, in the sense that if the State decides to intervene, such a policy would not
a¤ect the aggregate level, but may a¤ect the utility of the population. Remember the exam-
ple of education. This would mean that the aggregate level of education remains constant,
but by making it possible for agents to segregate, being then able to do what they want, the
utility of agents may increase. Let us now examine the di¤erent equilibria in terms of social
welfare using the utilitarian denition of the term3. Obviously, given the utility function
and the way the norm is dened, the segregating equilibrium is welfare maximizing. Hence,
in the two other types of equilibrium, total welfare is lower. The question is then to nd
out whether these two equilibria could be replaced by a segregating one in such a way that,
when taking the moving cost into account, the aggregate benet of moving is higher than
its aggregate cost. In other words, we need to investigate whether the individual decision
to move or not is optimal with respect to the corresponding aggregate cost and aggregate
benet. If not, the aggregate benet of moving towards another equilibrium would be higher
than the cost, so there is room for State intervention. Let us dene W as the total Social
3A Social Welfare Function W (u) is (purely) utilitarian if it has the form W (u)=
P
i ui
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Welfare in the economy
W =
X
i
X
k
nikUik  
nX
j=1
Cj 8i 2 fl; hg 8k 2 fA;Bg
with Cj =
8><>: C if agent j moves0 if agent j does not move
Total Social Welfare in a mixed equilibrium or in a merging equilibrium is given by
W 0 =  2(yh   yl) (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
Total Social Welfare when agents move away from a mixed equilibrium or a merging equilib-
rium in such a way that groups are segregated is given by
W SE =  (nlB + nhA)C
To study welfare properties, we need the following denition:
Denition 5 (Social Welfare Improving) Let (1lA; 
1
lB) and (
2
lA; 
2
lB) be two di¤erent
equilibria. Going from (1lA; 
1
lB) to (
2
lA; 
2
lB) is Social Welfare Improving (SWI) i¤
nX
j=1
U2j  
nX
j=1
U1j  
nX
j=1
C1!2j > 0 (1)
with C1!2j =
8><>: C if agent j moves between 1 and 20 if agent j does not move
with U ij the utility of agent j in distribution i
We now investigate under which conditions it is Social Welfare Improving to move to
segregated groups, and whether agents individually take the socially optimal decision of
moving or not. Before going to the Proposition, we need the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 2 It is Social Welfare Improving (SWI) to move to segregated groups i¤
C
yh   yl <
2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
Lemma 3 The individual benet of moving is always strictly smaller than the social benet
of moving, that is
lA   lB < 2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
Proof. See appendix.
This leads to our third proposition.
Proposition 3 1) In a segregating equilibrium, welfare is maximized and the equilibrium is
socially optimal
2) In a merging equilibrium or in a mixed equilibrium, agents individually take the socially
optimal decision of not moving if
C
yh   yl >
2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
.
3) In a merging equilibrium or in a mixed equilibrium, agents individually take the socially
suboptimal decision of not moving if lA lB 6 C
yh   yl <
2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
. In this
case, moving to segregated groups would improve social welfare.
Proof. From Proposition 1, Lemmas 2 and 3.
This proposition states that in a segregating equilibrium, the utility of each agent is
maximum, implying that total welfare is maximized. Obviously, this equilibrium is then
socially optimal. If, on the other hand, a mixed equilibirum or a merging equilibrium arises,
these are socially optimal or not depending on the size of the moving cost. In 2), the cost
is too high so that moving to a segregating equilibrium would decrease welfare. In the
third case, the cost of moving is too high so agents do not take the decision of moving by
themselves. However, it would be Social Welfare Improving to move to segregation. In that
case, agents take a suboptimal decision, in the sense that they are not able to break social
segregation on their own, while it would be optimal from an aggregate point of view. Hence,
State intervention is needed. The possibility for the State to intervene in order to solve this
ine¢ ciency is explored in section 3.4. Note that Proposition 3 is based on a relative cost, that
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is, the moving cost divided by yh yl. When the latter increases, everything else being equal,
agents are further from their ideal consumption, meaning that the relative cost of moving
decreases.
3.3 The Peer Pressure Game (PPG)
As outlined above, the ECG has two unrealistic properties. First, agents have to consume
the norm of the group, and do not maximize utility by choosing a consumption level, but
only by choosing a community. A model where both maximizations take place would be more
appropriate, in particular in order to take into account the cost of deviation from the norm.
Second, the linearity of the utility function of the ECG does not allow for asymmetry in
the moving decision. A more general model where both symmetric and asymmetric moving
decisions can exist would be more realistic. Hence, we use a new utility function in this Peer
Pressure Game to take account of the above mentioned remarks.
Uik =  (1  )(yi   yc;ik)2   (yk   yc;ik)2
with  2 (0; 1). In this game, an agent i in group k does not have to consume the norm
of the group, but instead, he will choose yc;ik in order to maximize his utility. The utility
function is divided into two parts: the rst one measures the cost of deviation that an agent
has to bear when consuming something di¤erent from his ideal consumption. The second
part measures the cost of deviation from the norm (social sanction). Thus, an agent tries to
minimize both deviation costs when choosing his consumption (one may think of examples
such as education or religion in some communities where agents choose something between
what the community prescribes and their own preferences). In this function,  measures
the strength of the norm on the individual. When  tends to one, the social pressure is so
strong that the agent consumes exactly the norm. When  tends to 0, the social constraint
plays no role, and the agent consumes his ideal level. Note that if the community is perfectly
homogenous, then as in the ECG the norm is exactly equal to the type, which is equal to the
ideal consumption of agents, meaning that utility will be maximized.
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The remainder of section 3.3 is organized as follows: in subsection 3.3.1, we investigate
individual behavior, showing that, in this specication, there is a possibility of asymmetry in
the moving decision which may lead to a new type of equilibrium in which one community
is composed of only one type of agents, while the other community is composed of both
types. In subsection 3.3.2, we study how the previous result a¤ects welfare and nd that a
non socially optimal individual decision remains possible. This subsection concentrates on
the results; all technical developments are in the appendix. Finally, in 3.3.3, we discuss the
results and the underlying assumptions.
3.3.1 Individual behavior
The consumption which maximizes the utility function given above is
yc;ik = (1  )yi + yk
With this level of consumption, the utility level is
Uik =  (1  ) [yi   yk]2
Proposition 4 8 (lA,lB) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], the aggregate level of y in the Peer Pressure
Game is the same as in the Enforced Consumption Game
Proof. See appendix
This result says that, in the same way as in the ECG, the aggregate level of y is always the
same, whatever the distribution of types across communities. Hence, as in the ECG, there
are only distributional e¤ects, that is when modifying the distribution of types, Y does not
change, but individual as well as total welfare may be modied. We now need to determine
the individual moving decision rule.
Denition 6 8i 2 fl; hg 8k 2 fA;Bg,
1) The set of agents of type i in k is a minority i¤ ik <  ik
2) The set of agents of type i in k is a relative minority i¤ ik < i k
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What matters in the decision rule is the relative minority, that is how small the set of
individuals of one type is with respect to the set of those of the same type in the other group.
This means that a majority inside a group may want to move because it is a relative minority
compared to the same type of individuals in the other group.
Lemma 4 1) Among agents initially located in A, only those of high type may want to move
to B, and they will do so if and only if
(lA   lB)(lB + lA) > C
(1  )(yl   yh)2
2) Among agents initially located in B, only those of low type may want to move to A,
and they will do so if and only if
(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > C
(1  )(yl   yh)2
Proof. See appendix
Three important features of this lemma should be outlined: rst, as in the ECG, only
the relative minority of each community (agents of low type in B and agents of high type
in A) may want to move. This obviously comes from the assumption on the distribution of
low types accross groups, and from the way the norm is dened. Second, the cost to which
the benet is compared can be seen as a relative cost, in the same way as in the previous
game. The interpretation of this remains that the bigger the di¤erence between the type, the
worse o¤ agents are (everything else being equal), the smaller the relative cost of moving (or
equivalently, the larger the benet of moving). Finally, and more importantly, there is now
a possibility of asymmetry in the moving decision rule. Indeed, as can be seen from lemma
4, the benet of moving may be di¤erent depending on which community agents belong
to. Moreover, the community which enjoys the larger benet depends on the distribution
of types, since this has an impact on which proportion is relatively the smallest. This is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 1) If lB + lA = 1, the distribution of types in each group is symmetric with
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respect to relative majority and relative minority, i.e. lA = hB and hA = lB.
2) If lB + lA > 1, the distribution of types in each group is asymmetric and hA is the
smallest relative minority (and also the smallest proportion if lB 6= lA).
3) If lB + lA < 1, the distribution of types in each group is asymmetric and lB is the
smallest relative minority (and also the smallest proportion if lB 6= lA).
Proof. See appendix
Having a symmetric distribution of types in each group means that the relative majority
in A is equal to the relative majority in B and the same for both minorities. In this case,
both moving decision rules are equivalent, meaning that we are brought back to the ECG in
the sense that if one side decides to move, the other side will also move. If the distribution
of types is not symmetric, relative minorities in each community are not equal, since one is
smaller than the other. In that case, agents who belong to the group in which their type
represents the smallest proportion in the economy are actually the furthest from their ideal
consumption, meaning that those people will have more incentives to move than those who
belong to the other relative minority. In other words, depending on the distribution of types
and on the cost of moving, new equilibria may arise, since the moving decision is no longer
symmetric.
In this game, an equilibrium is dened the following way
Denition 7 An equilibrium in the Peer Pressure Game is a pair (lA,

lB) such that
  (1  ) yi   ikyi    iky i2 >   (1  ) yi   i kyi    i ky i2   C
8i 2 fl; hg 8k 2 fA;Bg and i belongs to k
On top of the three types of equilibria already described in the ECG, a new one exists
in this game. It is such that one community is composed of a single type and the other one
of both types. We call this a semi-mixed equilibrium. The proposition below details all of
these possible equilibria. For simplicity, we dene a new parameter representing the relative
moving cost:  =
C
(1  )(yl   yh)2 .
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Proposition 5 With moving costs, there are four possible types of equilibria:
1) Merging equilibria when lA = 

lB, with 

lk 2 (0; 1)8k 2 fA;Bg
2) A segregating equilibrium when lA = 1 and 

lB = 0
3) Mixed equilibria when
a) lB + 

lA = 1 and (

lA   lB) 6 
b) lB + 

lA < 1 and (

lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] 6 
c) lB + 

lA > 1 and (

lA   lB)(lB + lA) 6 
4) Semi-mixed equilibria when lB = 0 and 

lA 2 (0; 1)
Proof. See appendix
Points 1), 2) and 3) of Proposition 5 are similar to the results of Proposition 1 in the
ECG. There is a merging equilibrium when both norms are equal, a mixed equilibrium in
which both types are present in each community when the moving cost is too high, and a
segregating equilibrium. Point 4) deals with the asymmetric case in which one community is
now composed of a unique type, but the other community is still formed by two types, the
moving cost being such that it is too costly for the minority to move to the other community.
These various situations are summarized in Figure I.
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Figure I: Equilibria
Figure I represents all of the possible equilibria taking moving costs into account. This
gure is designed under the assumption that nA = nB =
n
2
and with an arbitrary moving cost
 = 0:5. The vertical axis yields the proportion of low types in A, and the horizontal axis, the
proportion of low types in B. The upward sloping diagonal line is the set of distributions of
types such that a merging equilibrium arises, since proportions of low types are equal in the
two communities. Note that our model is based on the assumption that lA  lB. Hence,
our results are limited to the area above and on the upward sloping diagonal line. However,
for reasons of symmetry, we can interpret the lower area as well. The green points correspond
to the segregating equilibria, while the red area is the set of all mixed equilibria. The semi-
mixed equilibria are located on the blue line. Finally, the downward sloping diagonal line
is made of pairs corresponding to a symmetry in the distribution of types, so the moving
decision is common to both relative minorities. In the segregating equilibrium, we end up with
a segregation in types. On the contrary, in the mixed, semi-mixed, and merging equilibria,
social segregation is still present (partially in the semi-mixed equilibrium).
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3.3.2 Welfare and social optimality
In the previous subsection, we found that the equilibrium consumption will be located be-
tween the norm the "ideal" consumption, that there may be asymmetry in the moving
decision and that this leads to a new type of equilibrium in which one community is com-
posed of a single type of agents, while the other is composed of both types. What about
welfare? As in the previous section, given the utility function we use and the way the norm is
dened, the segregating equilibrium is still welfare maximizing. The question is then to nd
out if it is possible to make people move from one type of equilibrium to the segregating one,
while increasing welfare, taking into account the moving cost. If so, then agents may take a
decision that is individually optimal, while socially suboptimal. This possibility is analyzed
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 1) In the segregating equilibrium, the distribution of types is welfare maxi-
mizing and socially optimal.
2) In a mixed or a merging equilibrium, the distribution of types may either be socially
optimal or socially suboptimal. In the suboptimal cases, either the segregating equilibrium or
a semi-mixed equilibrium is socially optimal.
3) In a semi-mixed equilibrium, the distribution of types may either be socially optimal or
socially suboptimal. In the suboptimal cases, the segregating equilibrium is socially optimal.
Proof. See appendix
This proposition deals with the optimality versus suboptimality of indivual decisions. It
states that, with the exception of the segregating type equilibrium, all other types of equilibria
allow for the possibility of suboptimality. This will happen when the cost is too high with
respect to the benet to be beared individually, while it would be socially a good thing to
move to half or full segregation. It means that, as in the ECG, agents cannot themselves
break the social segregation, while from an aggregate point of view, it would be better to
have segregation in types. This can be seen in Figure II. Axes and diagonal lines have the
same interpretation as in Figure I.
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Figure II: Social optimality
The green point represents the segregating equilibrium in which agents individually take
the optimal decision of moving to full segregation. The dark blue line represents the semi-
mixed equilibria such that agents individually take the suboptimal decision of not moving to
the segregating equilibrium. The light blue line represents the semi-mixed equilibria such that
agents individually take the optimal decision not moving to the segregating equilibrium. The
yellow area represents the mixed equilibria such that agents individually take the suboptimal
decision of not moving to the segregating equilibrium. The orange area represents the mixed
equilibria such that agents individually take the suboptimal decision of not moving to a semi-
mixed equilibrium. The red area represents the mixed equilibria such that agents individually
take the optimal decision of not moving.
3.3.3 Segregation as welfare maximizing
In our model, in the absence of moving costs, segregation by types is welfare maximizing.
Indeed, in case of segregation by types, there is only one type of agent in each community,
meaning that the norm in a community is exactly equal to the type composing the group,
42
and hence that consumption is equal to the type. This means that agents value the ho-
mogeneity of the group (think of a religious community in which people prefer to interact
only with believers). Of course, this assumption could be replaced by a taste of individuals
for heterogeneity. This may be interpreted as some kind of complementarity between types,
meaning that segregation by types would no longer be welfare maximizing. In our view, both
assumptions are realistic, they simply describe di¤erent situations.
People often understand the term segregation as some kind of ordinal ranking between
agents. It is important to underline that in our model, there exists no vertical di¤erentiation
between agents, which means that being a high type agent is not "better" than being a low
type agent. Segregation by types is then not a bad thing.
As stated above, in the presence of moving costs modelled as social assets needed to
enter into a new community, socially optimal equilibria may not be reached because the
individual cost of moving is too high with respect to the private benet. Moreover, if the
moving cost is really high, then segregation by types may be not optimal at all. Analyzing
these various situations is exactly the point of this paper: can social segregation be replaced
by a segregation by types? In other words, the question is to nd out to what extent,
or under which circumstances, the social environment of an individual exerts a burden on
him preventing him of choosing a consumption that ts his type or from joining another
community where he could enjoy such a consumption. The results of our paper identify
conditions under which these situations arise.
The results rely on a few assumptions. The rst one is a symmetric cost of moving
between the two communities. We do not consider this assumption to be unrealistic or too
strong. Of course, it is possible that going from A to B is cheaper that going from B to A
because, for example, B requests more general assets, that are shared by many communities,
while A exhibits really specic assets. Modifying the assumption to take this into account
would however not change the results qualitatively. The second assumption is that the
type of a agent is independent of his social assets. More precisely, we assume that social
assets are predetermined at the community level, independently of the composition of the
43
community (a kind of historical inheritance), while the type of the agent is exogeneously
given, independently of where he is born. Imposing this independence makes the problem
easier to solve, and it is not completely unrealistic, especially in a static game. Of course, in
a dynamic setting, it would be plausible that the social assets of a community evolve with the
composition of the community, which would have an impact on the moving costs and thus
on the arising equilibria. This type of evolution of some communities is observed in everyday
life, but this phenomenon takes time, and would be better investigated in a dynamic setting.
3.4 State intervention and Pareto improvement
In the two previous sections, we showed that agents may take suboptimal decisions in the
sense that they do not take a decision individually, while taking it would be social welfare
improving. The reason for this is the moving cost which may be too high with respect to the
private benet, even if aggregate benet is higher than aggregate cost. Equation (1) in section
3.2 dened the condition under which it is Social Welfare Improving to go from (1lA; 
1
lB) to
(2lA; 
2
lB). Suppose that the SWI condition is satised between a given equilibrium and a
segregating equilibrium, but no agents do move because of too high a cost. In this case, State
intervention can correct this suboptimal situation by operating transfers between agents in
order to decrease the individual cost.
The transfer scheme T (2 Rn) is the following: an agent j gets a transfer tj 2 R; j =
1; :::; n such that
tj
8><>: > 0 if U
2
j   U1j   C1!2j  0
< 0 if U2j   U1j   C1!2j > 0
(2)
nX
j=1
U2j  
nX
j=1
U1j  
nX
j=1
C1!2j +
nX
j=1
tj > 0 (3)
U2j   U1j   C1!2j + tj > 0 (4)
nX
j=1
tj  0 (5)
(3) ensures that it is still social welfare improving to go from (1lA; 
1
lB) to (
2
lA; 
2
lB) with
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transfers, (5) says that the State cannot spend more than what it gets, and (4) means that,
with transfers, agents take the decision of moving individually. (2) describes the structure
of the transfers. This transfer scheme is possible since (1) means that the net aggregate
benet of going from (1lA; 
1
lB) to (
2
lA; 
2
lB) is strictly greater than the cost, meaning that
this benet is large enough to be taxed and used to cover the cost. It must be noted that (4)
implies that this tranfer scheme not only solves the suboptimality problem, but also ensures
that (2lA; 
2
lB) is SWI as well as Pareto Improving (PI), which is outlined by the following
lemma
Lemma 6 If going from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2 is SWI, then there exists a transfer
scheme T 2 Rn such that it is also PI.
Hence, the State can solve the problem of suboptimality of some equilibria, thereby killing
the social segregation, and it can do it in such a way that the new equilibrium is also Pareto
improving. This is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 When a socially suboptimal equilibrium is reached, the State can operate
transfers between agents in such a way that a socially optimal equilibrium is reached and that
this new equilibrium is also Pareto improving.
Nevertheless, there exists cases in which the State cannot operate transfers. This happens
when the aggregate cost of moving is higher than the aggregate benet. In these situations,
indivuals are stuck in a community in which the social constraint forces them to consume
something that does not t their types. In these cases, the social segregation problem cannot
be solved.
4 Conclusion
We started this paper with the example of undereducation in some neighborhoods to suggest
that social capital, a specic form of interpersonal relationships, may have a negative impact
on agents. The basic mechanism worked in the following way: a community, characterized by
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specic social assets, constrains its members with a strong norm and a high deviation cost.
However, it sometimes seems to be quite di¢ cult for the members to leave their communities.
Our paper proposes an explanation for this phenomenon, both intuitively and analytically,
relying on the existing literature as well as an original analysis.
The main argument is that the moving cost may prevent agents from changing commu-
nities, and high deviation costs constrain agentsconsumption. Hence, people are forced to
follow the norm, without a possibility of escape.
Using a simple model with two types of agents, two groups and an endogenous norm, we
show that, depending on the distribution of types accross communities and on the moving
cost, di¤erent kinds of equilibria arise. Among them, two are of particular interest because
either the whole population or part of it cannot bear the cost of moving individually although
their preferences are such that they would like to do so. We stress that in these cases, State
intervention may sometimes overcome this problem by operating transfers between agents
to lighten the cost, and hence moving from a social segregation to a segregation in types.
This result is of primary importance concerning e¢ ciency of public policies: it is possible
to design policies in order to allow people who want to get educated to join a community
in which they will be able to do so without su¤ering from any punishment by their peers,
leading to social welfare improvement. Unfortunately, it is sometimes impossible for the
State to intervene because the aggregate cost is too high, because, for example, the two
communities are really di¤erent in terms of social assets. Individuals are then stuck in their
original community, being forced to consume something they do not want to consume because
of the norm. In these cases, the social segregation cannot be replaced by a segregation in
types. It is important to note that we do not encourage at all any segregation between clever
and less gifted pupils, but rather segregation between those who want to get educated and
those who do not, without taking intelligence into account.
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Appendices
A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 1
Proof. If i in k decides to move, we have that
  jyi   ykj <  
yi   y k  C
Suppose yi   yk > 0. This means that yi   y k > 0, and hence
 yi + yk <  yi + y k   C
yk   y k <  C
Since yi   yk > 0, y i   y k < 0 and y i   yk < 0. If an agent  i in  k decides to move,
the following must be true
  y i   y k <   jy i   ykj   C
y i   y k < y i   yk   C
yk   y k <  C
Hence, the decision rule is the same for the two agent.
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A.2 Proposition 1
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that in this game, decision rule of both agents are the same.
Hence, for moving to take place and since by assumptions yA  yB, we must have
yA   yB <  C
lAyl + hAyh   (lByl + hByh) <  C
(lA   lB)yl + (hA   hB)yh <  C
(lA   lB)yl + (1  lA   1 + lB)yh <  C
lA(yl   yh)  lB(yl   yh) <  C
lA   lB >   C
yl   yh
If 0lA = 
0
lB, this condition is violated, and no moving takes place (and norms are equal in
both communities).
A.3 Proposition 2
Proof. The aggregate level of y (Y ) is given by
Y = nAyA + nByB
= nA (lAyl + hAyh) + nB(lByl + hByh)
= nA

nlA
nA
yl +
nhA
nA
yh

+ nB(
nlB
nB
yl +
nhB
nB
yh)
= nlAyl + nhAyh + nlByl + nhByh
= (nlA + nlB)yl + (nhA + nhB)yh
= nlyl + nhyh
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A.4 Lemma 3
Proof. First, remember that the individual moving rule was given by
lA   lB ? C
yh   yl
We must compare lA   lB and 2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
. Suppose that lA   lB >
2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
.
1) if lA = lB, then we have 0 >
2 (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
(nlB + nhA)
which is not possible.
2) if lA > lB :
(lA   lB)(nlB + nA   nlA) > 2nl   2nA2lA   2nB2lB
nlBlA + nAlA   nlAlA   nlBlB   nAlB + nlAlB > 2nl   2nA2lA   2nB2lB
nBlAlB + nAlA   nA2lA   nB2lB   nAlB + nAlAlB > 2nl   2nA2lA   2nB2lB
nA
2
lA + nB
2
lB + nlAlB + nA(lA   lB) > 2(nAlA + nBlB)
nA
2
lA + nB
2
lB + nlAlB   nAlA   nAlB   2nBlB > 0
nA [
2
lA + lAlB   lA   lB] + nB [2lB + lAlB   2lB] > 0
nA [lA(lA + lB)  (lA + lB)] > nBlB [2  (lA + lB)]
nA(lA + lB) (lA   1) > nBlB [2  (lA + lB)]
nA
nB
6 lB
lA   1
2  (lA + lB)
lA + lB
which is not possible
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A.5 Proposition 4
Proof.
Y = nlA [(1  )yl + yA] + nhA [(1  )yh + yA] + nlB [(1  )yl + yB]
+nhB [(1  )yh + yB]
= [nlA(1  ) + nlB(1  )] yl + [nhA(1  ) + nhB(1  )] yh + [nlA+ nhA] yA
+ [nlB+ nhB] yB
= (1  )(nlA + nlB)yl + (1  )(nhA + nhB)yh + (nlA + nhA)yA + (nlB + nhB)yB
= (1  )nlyl + (1  )nhyh + nAyA + nByB
= nlyl + nhyh    [nlyl + nhyh] +  [nAyA + nByB]
= nlyl + nhyh
A.6 Lemma 4
Proof. 1) Agents decide to move from A to B if
 (1  )(yi   yA)2 <  (1  )(yi   yB)2   C
 (1  )(yi   yA)2 + (1  )(yi   yB)2 <  C
(1  ) (yi   yB)2   (yi   yA)2 <  C
(1  ) y2i   2yiyB + y2B   y2i + 2yiyA   y2A <  C
(1  ) 2yi(yA   yB)  (y2A   y2B) <  C
(1  )(yA   yB) [2yi   (yA + yB)] <  C
(1  )(lA   lB)(yl   yh) [2yi   (lB + lA)(yl   yh)  2yh] <  C
(1  )(lA   lB)(yl   yh) [2(yi   yh)  (lB + lA)(yl   yh)] <  C
53
If i = l
(1  )(yl   yh)2(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] <  C
which is impossible. If i = h
 (1  )(yl   yh)2(lA   lB)(lB + lA) <  C
(1  )(yl   yh)2(lA   lB)(lB + lA) > C
(lA   lB)(lB + lA) > C
(1  )(yl   yh)2
2) Agents decide to move from B to A if
 (1  )(yi   yB)2 <  (1  )(yi   yA)2   C
 (1  )(yi   yB)2 + (1  )(yi   yA)2 <  C
(1  ) (yi   yA)2   (yi   yB)2 <  C
(1  ) y2i   2yiyA + y2A   y2i + 2yiyB   y2B <  C
(1  ) 2yi(yB   yA)  (y2B   y2A) <  C
(1  ) [2yi(yB   yA)  (yB   yA)(yB + yA)] <  C
(1  )(yB   yA) [2yi   (yB + yA)] <  C
(1  )(lB   lA)(yl   yh) [2yi   (lB + lA)(yl   yh)  2yh] <  C
(1  )(lB   lA)(yl   yh) [2(yi   yh)  (lB + lA)(yl   yh)] <  C
if i = h
 (1  )(lB   lA)(lB + lA)(yl   yh)2 <  C
which is impossible. If i = l
(1  )(yl   yh)2(lB   lA) [2  (lB + lA)] <  C
(1  )(yl   yh)2(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > C
(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > C
(1  )(yl   yh)2
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A.7 Lemma 5
Proof.
lB + lA = 1
lB = 1  lA = hA
lA = 1  lB = hB
If lB + lA > 1 and lA 6= lB, then hA is the smallest proportion. If lB + lA < 1 and
lA 6= lB, then lB is the smallest proportion.
lA > lB (1)
1  hA > 1  hB
hB > hA (2)
lB + lA > 1
lB + 1  hA > 1
lB > hA (3)
lB + lA < 1
lB + 1  hA < 1
lB < hA (4)
(1) + (3) : hA < lB < lA
(2) : hA < hB
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(4) + (2) : lB < hA < hB
(1) : lB < lA
A.8 Proposition 5
Proof. Starting from any distribution,
1) If lB = lA, then yA = yB and no type has an incentive to bear the moving cost.
2) If lB + lA = 1, then the decision rule is the same for each type:
if lA   lB >  then both relative minorities move
if lA   lB   then no one moves
3) If lB + lA < 1, then,
(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > (lA   lB)(lB + lA)
a) if  > (lA lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > (lA lB)(lB+lA), then it is too expensive
for both types to move, and no one moves
b) if (lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > (lA   lB)(lB + lA) > , then each type has
an incentive to move, since cost is smaller than benet
c) 9 > 0 :
(lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] >  > (lA   lB)(lB + lA)
Hence, in a rst step, all low types of B goes to A, which means that 1lB = 0 and lA
increases. In a second step, high types of A will move to B i¤
(1lA   1lB)(1lB + 1lA) >  
1lA
2
> 
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 <

nlA + nlB
nA + nlB
2
otherwise, high types in A stay there.
4) If lB + lA > 1, we have
(lA   lB)(lB + lA) > (lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)]
a) if  > (lA lB)(lB+lA) > (lA lB) [2  (lB + lA)], then it is too expensive
for both types to move, and no one moves
b) if (lA   lB)(lB + lA) > (lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)] > , then each type has
an incentive to move, since cost is smaller than benet
c) 9 > 0 :
(lA   lB)(lB + lA) >  > (lA   lB) [2  (lB + lA)]
Hence, in a rst step, all high types of A goes to be B, which means that 1hA = 0 and
1lA = 1. In a second step, low types of B will move to A i¤
 < (1lA   1lB)

2  (1lB + 1lA)

 < (1  1lB)

2  (1lB + 1)

 < (1  1lB)(1  1lB)
 <

nhA + nhB
nB + nhA
2
otherwise, low types in B stay there.
A.9 Proposition 6
Part 1
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The total social welfare in a mixed equilibrium or in a merging equilibrium is given by
W 0 =  (1  )
( 
nly
2
l + nhy
2
h
  (nlAyl + nhAyh)2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
while the total social welfare when everybody moves from a mixed equilibrium or a merg-
ing equilibrium to a segregating equilibrium is
W SE =  (nhA + nlB)C
Besides these two extreme cases, the PPG allows for semi-mixed equilibrium. For the
rest of the proof, we use the term "full segregation" to refer to cases in which agents move
from a mixed equilibrium or a merging equilibrium to a segregating equilibrium, and "half-
segregation" for cases in which agents move from a mixed equilibrium or a merging equilib-
rium to a semi-mixed equilibrium. In the case of half-segregation, if lB + lA > 1, all high
types in community A will move to community B and pay a moving cost equal to C. Hence,
the norm in A will be yA = yl, and the total social welfare amounts to
W half;h =  (1  )
( 
nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h
  (nlByl + nhyh)2
nlB + nh
)
  nhAC
On the other hand, if lB+lA < 1, all low types in community B will move to community
A and pay a moving cost equal to C. Hence, the norm in B will be yB = yh, and the total
social welfare will be
W half;l =  (1  )
( 
nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h
  (nlyl + nhAyh)2
nl + nhA
)
  nlBC
Finally, the total social welfare when agents move from a semi-mixed equilibrium to the
segregating equilibrium is given by
W SE =  nlBC
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when lB + lA > 1, and
W SE =  nhAC
when lB + lA < 1. Before going to the details of the welfare analysis, one more denition
is necessary:
Denition 8 Suppose moving from (1lA; 
1
lB) to (
v
lA; 
v
lB) is Social Welfare Improving (SWI)
for all v such that (vlA; 
v
lB) is an equilibrium. Then, moving from (
1
lA; 
1
lB) to (
2
lA; 
2
lB) is
Socially Optimal (SO) i¤
 
nX
j=1
U2j  
nX
j=1
C1!2j
!
 
 
nX
j=1
U vj  
nX
j=1
C1!vj
!
> 0
The di¤erence between SWI and SO lies in the fact that SWI only requires total welfare
to be higher at the new equilibrium, while SO imposes that social welfare is the highest
among all the SWI equilibria. The three lemmas here under investigate the welfare property
as well as the social optimality of half-segregation and full segregation.
Lemma 7 It is SWI to move to half-segregation i¤
1) when lB + lA > 1,  < lA   lBelB
2) when lB + lA < 1,  < hB   hAehA
where elB = nlB
nB + nhA
and ehA = nhA
nA + nlB
Proof. Social optimality of half segregation if lB + lA > 1 :
,  (1  )
(
(nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlByl + nhyh)
2
nlB + nh
)
  nhAC
>  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
, (nlBy2l + nhy2h) 
(nlByl + nhyh)
2
nlB + nh
+ nhA
C

  (nly2l + nhy2h) +
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
+
(nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
< 0
, (nlB   nl)y2l  
(nlByl + nhyh)
2
nlB + nh
+
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
+
(nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
+ nhA
C

< 0
, nhA
 
C

  (yl   yh)
2 (nhA (nlA   nlB)nlB + nlA (nhA + 2nlB)nhB + nlAn2hB)
(nlA + nhA) (nlB + nhB) (nhA + nlB + nhB)
!
< 0
59
, C

<
(yl   yh)2 (nhA (nlA   nlB)nlB + nlA (nhA + 2nlB)nhB + nlAn2hB)
(nlA + nhA) (nlB + nhB) (nhA + nlB + nhB)
, C
 (yl   yh)2
<
nlAnhAnlB   nhAn2lB + nlAnhAnhB + 2nlAnlBnhB + nlAn2hB
(nlA + nhA) (nlB + nhB) (nhA + nlB + nhB)
,  < nlA
nA
  n
2
lB
nB (nA + nB   nlA) =
nlA
nA
  nlB
nB
nlB
(nhA + nlB + nhB)
,  < lA   lBelB
Social optimality of half segregation if lB + lA < 1 :
,  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
)
  nlBC
>  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
, (nly2l + nhAy2h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
+ nlB
C

  (nly2l + nhy2h) +
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
+
(nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
< 0
, (nhA   nh)y2h  
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
+
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
+
(nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
+ nlB
C

< 0
,  < 1  lB   nhA
nA
nhA
(nA + nlB)
()  < hB   hAehA
Lemma 8 It is SWI to move to segregated groups i¤
 < lA

nhA
nhA + nlB

+ hB

nlB
nhA + nlB

Proof. ,   (nhA + nlB)C >  (1 )
(
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
,   (nhA + nlB)C
+(1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
> 0
,   (nhA + nlB) C

+ (nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
> 0
, (nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nlA + nhA
+
(nlByl + nhByh)
2
nlB + nhB
 (nlA+nlB)y2l  (nhA+nhB)y2h+(nhA + nlB)
C

< 0
, C

<
1
nhA + nlB
(
(nlA + nlB)y
2
l + (nhA + nhB)y
2
h  
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nlA + nhA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nlB + nhB
)
, C
 (yl   yh)2
<
nlAnhAnlB + nhAnlBnhB + nlA(nhA + nlB)nhB
(nlA + nhA)(nlB + nhB) (nhA + nlB)
,  < nB (nA   nlA)nlA + nAnBnlB   nAn
2
lB
nAnB(nA   nlA + nlB)
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,  < nlA
nA
(nA   nlA)
(nA   nlA + nlB) +
nlB
(nA   nlA + nlB)  
nlB
nB
nlB
(nA   nlA + nlB)
,  < lA nhA
nhA + nlB
+
nlB
nhA + nlB
(1  nlB
nB
)
,  < lA nhA
nhA + nlB
+ hB
nlB
nhA + nlB
Lemma 9 It is SWI to move from semi-mixed equilibrium to segregating equilibrium i¤
 <
nlA + nlB
nA + nlB
if 0lB + 
0
lA < 1
 <
nhA + nhB
nhA + nB
if 0lB + 
0
lA > 1
Proof. It is better to have full segregation rather than half segregation (0lB + 
0
lA < 1) i¤
,   (nhA + nlB)C >  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
)
  nlBC
,  nhAC >  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
)
, C
(1  ) <
1
nhA
(
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
)
, C
(1  ) <
1
nhA

(yl   yh)2

nhA (nlA + nlB)
nl + nhA

, C
(1  ) (yl   yh)2
<
(nlA + nlB)
nA + nlB
By symmetry, if 0lB + 
0
lA < 1
, C
(1  ) (yl   yh)2
<
(nhA + nhB)
nhA + nB
The question is to know whether in terms of welfare, full segregation or half-segregation
is better. To analyse this, we must take a closer look at the three lemmas given above. For
the simplicity of the reminder of the proof, we restrict ourselves to the following subset S of
initial conditions:
S = f(lA; lB) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) : lA > lB and lB + lA  1g
This is done without loss of generality since all other cases can be deduced by symmetry.
Hence, we restrict the analysis to the interval of initial distribution [lB = 0; lB + lA = 1].
Let us rst dene three social functions. The social benet function of full segregation 
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with

 = lA

nhA
nhA + nlB

+ hB

nlB
nhA + nlB

the social benet function of half segregation  when lB + lA < 1, with
 = hB   hAehA
and the social benet of full segregation rather than half segregation  with
 =
nlA + nlB
nA + nlB
Proposition 8 For given n, nA, nB, and a given  2 (0; 1), 9 lB: 8 lB 2 [0; lB) ;9 values
of lA; (lA; lB) 2 S; such that
 >  > 

8 lB 2 (lB; lB : lB + lA = 1] ;9 values of lA; (lA; lB) 2 S; s:t:

 >  > 
Proof. Step 1. When lB = 0 (meaning that nlB = 0), 
 = lA and  = 1  hAehA. SinceehA = hA when nlB = 0, 
(lB = 0) < (lB = 0). When lB + lA = 1, 
 = hB. Hence,

(lB + lA = 1) > (lB + lA = 1).
Step 2. Fix a  2 (0; 1). Suppose 
 (lA; lB)   = 0 and rewrite with nlA as a function
of nlB (with n, nA, nB given): nlA = !(nlB). This function gives all of the pairs (i.e. initial
conditions) such that the social benet of moving to full segregation is exactly equal to the
cost. In the same way, suppose  (lA; lB)    = 0 and rewrite with nlA as a function of
nlB (with n, nA, nB given): nlA = (nlB). This function yields all of the pairs (i.e. initial
conditions) such that the social benet of moving to half-segregation is exactly equal to the
cost. ! and  are both twice continuously di¤erentiable (on their domains) and strictly
convex functions. By steps 1 and 2, ! and  cross each other an odd number of times.
Step 3. To show that these two functions cross only once, consider  (lA; lB), suppose
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 (lA; lB)    = 0 and rewrite with nlA as a function of nlB (with n, nA, nB given):
nlA = (nlB).  is a twice continuously di¤erentiable, linear and strictly decreasing function.
Now, let us prove that that ! and  cross exactly once.
Step 4. Suppose by contradiction that ! and  cross more than once, say three times
(remember that they must cross an odd number of times), at (n1lA; n
1
lB) ; (n
2
lA; n
2
lB) ; (n
3
lA; n
3
lB).
Consider the four areas Zi (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) between the two bounds ([lB = 0; lB + lA = 1],
the two functions (! and ) and the three crossing points:
1) in Z1 = [nlB = 0; n1lB)  fnlA : ! (nlB) > nlA >  (nlB)g , we have a set of initial con-
ditions such that it is optimal to have half-segregation but not full segregation
2) in Z2 = (n1lB; n
2
lB) fnlA :  (nlB) > nlA > ! (nlB)g, we have a set of initial conditions
such that it is optimal to have full segregation but not half-segregation
3) in Z3 = (n2lB; n
3
lB) fnlA : ! (nlB) > nlA >  (nlB)g, we have a set of initial conditions
such that it is optimal to have half-segregation but not full segregation
4) in Z4 = (n3lB; nlB : lB + lA = 1)  fnlA :  (nlB) > nlA > ! (nlB)g, we have a set of
initial conditions such that it is optimal to have full segregation but not half-segregation.
Remember that  is a linear and strictly decreasing function, above which it is better to
have full segregation than half-segregation, while the converse is true below. Note also that
in nlB = 0, nA >  = nA = ! >  > 0. Since inside a Zi it is optimal to have either half or
full segregation, but not the two simultaneously,  cannot cross an area, and hence can only
cross ! and  at a crossing point. Moreover, since ! and  are strictly convex and  is linear
and strictly decreasing,  can cross ! and  only once .
a) Suppose this occurs at (n3lA; n
3
lB). Then, at any point below the function, it is better
to have half-segregation rather than full segregation. But this contradicts the interpretation
of Z2. Hence, it cannot occur at (n3lA; n
3
lB).
b) Suppose this occurs at (n2lA; n
2
lB). Then, at any point below the function, it is better
to have full segregation than half-segregation. But this contradicts the interpretation of Z3.
Hence, it cannot occur at (n2lA; n
2
lB).
c) Suppose this occurs at (n1lA; n
1
lB). Then, at any point below the function, it is better
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to have half-segregation than full segregation. This is coherent with the interpretation of Z1.
Above the function, it is better to have full segregation than half-segregation. This means
that we can only have areas of type Z2 above the function, and the only way of having this
is that ! and  do not cross again.
We have thus proved that ! and  can cross only once, at (n1lA; n
1
lB) = (lA; lB).
This proposition tells us there are distribution of types such that full segregation is optimal
but not half-segregation, and others for which the converse is true. Since when nlB = 0,
nA >  = nA = ! >  > 0, there are also cases in which both conditions are met, and
others in which none of them are fullled. This result is depicted in Figure III
Figure III: Distribution of types and Social optimality
Axes and diagonal lines have the same interpretations as in Figure I. The yellow area
represents the pairs for which it is socially optimal to have full segregation. The orange
area is the one where it is socially optimal to have half-segregagtion. Finally, the red area
corresponds to intial conditions such that it is not optimal to segregate groups.
Part 2
Once we know what is socially optimal, and what is not, we must study whether consumers
individually take the optimal decision or not. Since we are investigating the case 0lB+
0
lA < 1
64
it is obvious that
(lA   lB) (lA + lB) < (lA   lB) [2  (lA + lB)]
Lemma 10 The individual benet of moving is always strictly smaller than the social benet
of having "half-segregation", that is
(lA   lB) (lA + lB) < (lA   lB) [2  (lA + lB)] < hB   hAehA
Proof. , (lA   lB) [2  (lA + lB)] ? hB   hAehA
, 2 (lA   lB)  (lA   lB) (lA + lB) ? hB   hAehA
, 2 [(1  hA)  (1  hB)]  [(1  hA)  (1  hB)] [(1  hA) + (1  hB)]
? hB   hAehA
, 2(hB   hA)  (hB   hA) (2  hA   hB) ? hB   hAehA
, 2(hB   hA)  2(hB   hA)  (hB   hA)( hA   hB) ? hB   hAehA
, 2hB   2hA ? hB   hAehA
, hB(hB   1) < hA(hA   ehA)
This lemma means that as soon as one type decides to move, it is at least social welfare
improving to have half-segregation. Moreover, even if nobody moves, it could be SWI to
have half-segregation.
Part 3: proof of Proposition 6
Point 1 is obvious by denition of the equilibria and the social welfare function.
For point 2, by Proposition 7, neither 
 nor  is always the largest. Hence, if the moving
cost is higher than the larger of the two, then there is no advantage to move, and the decision
taken individually by agents is optimal. If, on the other hand, at least one of the two functions
is higher than the cost, then it would have been optimal for agents to move to half or full
segregation, depending on the values of 
;; and . In that case, individual decisions are
suboptimal.
Concerning point 3, we know by lemma 10 that as soon as agents of one type decide to
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move, it is social welfare improving to have at least half-segregation. Depending on the size
of the moving cost with respect to the social benet of having full segregation, the individual
decision will be optimal (if it is relatively too expensive to fully segregate) or suboptimal (if
both lemmas 8 and 9 are fullled).
B Computation
B.1 Utility in ECG when nobody moves
Proof. ,  nlA jyl   yAj   nhA jyh   yAj   nlB jyl   yBj   nhB jyh   yBj
,  nlA(yA   yl)  nhA(yh   yA)  nlB(yB   yl)  nhB(yh   yB)
, (nlAyl   nhAyh) + yA(nhA   nlA) + (nlByl   nhByh) + yB(nhB   nlB)
, (nlyl   nhyh) + (lAyl + hAyh)(nhA   nlA) + (lByl + hByh)(nhB   nlB)
, nlyl   nhyh + (nlAnA yl +
nhA
nA
yh)(nhA   nlA) + (nlBnB yl +
nhB
nB
yh)(nhB   nlB)
, 1
nAnB
8><>: nAnBnlyl   nAnBnhyh + (nBnlAyl + nBnhAyh)(nhA   nlA)+(nAnlByl + nAnhByh)(nhB   nlB)
9>=>;
, 1
nAnB
8><>: nAnBnlyl   nAnB(n  nl)yh + (nBnlAyl + nB(nA   nlA)yh)(nA   2nlA)+(nAnlByl + nA(nB   nlB)yh)(nB   2nlB)
9>=>;
, 1
nAnB
8><>: nAnBnlyl   nAnBnyh + nAnBnlyh + (nBnlAyl + nBnAyh   nBnlAyh)(nA   2nlA)+(nAnlByl + nAnByh   nAnlByh)(nB   2nlB)
9>=>;
, 1
nAnB
8>>>><>>>>:
nAnBnlyl   nAnBnyh + nAnBnlyh + nAnBnlAyl + nBn2Ayh   nAnBnlAyh
 2nBn2lAyl   2nAnBnlAyh + 2nBn2lAyh + nAnBnlByl + nAn2Byh   nAnBnlByh
 2nAn2lByl   2nAnBnlByh + 2nAn2lByh
9>>>>=>>>>;
, 1
nAnB
8><>:  3nAnBnlAyh   3nAnBnlByh + 2nBn
2
lAyh   2nAn2lByl + 2nAnBnlyl + 2nAn2lByh
 2nBn2lAyl + nAnBnlyh + nBn2Ayh + nAn2Byh   nAnBnyh
9>=>;
, 1
nAnB
8><>:  3nAnByh(nlA + nlB) + 2nBn
2
lA(yh   yl) + 2nAnBnlyl + 2nAn2lB(yh   yl)
+nAnBnlyh + nBnAyh(nA + nB   n)
9>=>;
, 1
nAnB
f 2nAnBnlyh + 2nAnBnlyl + 2(yh   yl) [nBn2lA + nAn2lB]g
, 1
nAnB
2(yh   yl) f nAnBnl + nBn2lA + nAn2lBg
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, 2(yh   yl)
h
 nl + n
2
lB
nB
+
n2lA
nA
i
,  2(yh   yl) (nl   nlAlA   nlBlB)
B.2 Utility at the optimum in the PPG
Proof.
 (1  ) [yi   (1  )yi   yk]2    [yk   (1  )yi   yk]2
 (1  ) [(yi   yk)]2    [(1  )(yk   yi)]2
 2(1  ) [yi   yk]2   (1  )2 [yk   yi]2
 (1  ) [yi   yk]2 f+ (1  )g
 (1  ) [yi   yk]2
B.3 Useful Computation
Proof.
(yB   yA) = lByl + hByh   lAyl   hAyh
= (lB   lA)yl + (hB   hA)yh
= (lB   lA)yl + (1  lB   1 + lA)yh
= (lB   lA)yl   (lB   lA)yh
= (lB   lA)(yl   yh)
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(yB + yA) = lByl + hByh + lAyl + hAyh
= (lB + lA)yl + (hB + hA)yh
= (lB + lA)yl + (1  lB + 1  lA)yh
= (lB + lA)yl   (lB + lA)yh + 2yh
= (lB + lA)(yl   yh) + 2yh
(yA   yB) = lAyl + hAyh   lByl   hByh
= (lA   lB)yl + (hA   hB)yh
= (lA   lB)yl + (1  lA   1 + lB)yh
= (lA   lB)yl   (lA   lB)yh
= (lA   lB)(yl   yh)
B.4 Utility when nobody moves in the PPG
Proof. ,  nlA(1  )(yl   yA)2   nhA(1  )(yh   yA)2   nlB(1  )(yl   yB)2
 nhB(1  )(yh   yB)2
,  (1 )
8><>: nlA(y
2
l   2ylyA + y2A) + nhA(y2h   2yhyA + y2A) + nlB(y2l   2ylyB + y2B)
+nhB(y
2
h   2yhyB + y2B)
9>=>;
,  (1 ) f(nly2l + nhy2h) + nAy2A + nBy2B   2yl(nlAyA + nlByB)  2yh(nhAyA + nhByB)g
,  (1  )
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) + nA(
n2lAy
2
l + n
2
hAy
2
h + 2nlAnhAylyh
n2A
)
+nB(
n2lBy
2
l + n
2
hBy
2
h + 2nlBnhBylyh
n2B
)
 2yl

n2lAyl + nlAnhAyh
nA
+
n2lByl + nlBnhByh
nB

 2yh

nlAnhAyl + n
2
hAyh
nA
+
nlBnhByl + n
2
hByh
nB

9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
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,  (1  )
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h)
+
1
nAnB
0B@ nBn2lAy2l + nBn2hAy2h + 2nBnlAnhAylyh
+nAn
2
lBy
2
l + nAn
2
hBy
2
h + 2nAnlBnhBylyh
1CA
 2nBn2lAy2l   2nBnlAnhAylyh   2nAn2lBy2l   2nAnlBnhBylyh
 2nBnlAnhAylyh   2nBn2hAy2h   2nAnlBnhBylyh   2nAn2hBy2h
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
,  (1  )
8>>>><>>>>:
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h)
+
1
nAnB
264 ( nBn2lA   nAn2lB) y2l + ( nBn2hA   nAn2hB) y2h
+( 2nBnlAnhA   2nAnlBnhB) ylyh
375
9>>>>=>>>>;
,  (1  )
8><>:(nly2l + nhy2h)  1nAnB
264 nB (n2lAy2l + n2hAy2h + nlAnhAylyh)
+nA (n
2
lBy
2
l + n
2
hBy
2
h + 2nlBnhBylyh)
375
9>=>;
,  (1 )

(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
n2lAy
2
l + n
2
hAy
2
h + nlAnhAylyh
nA
  n
2
lBy
2
l + n
2
hBy
2
h + 2nlBnhBylyh
nB

,  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlAyl + nhAyh)
2
nA
  (nlByl + nhByh)
2
nB
)
B.5 Utility when one side moves: lB + lA > 1
Proof. ,  nlB(1  )(yl   eyB)2   (nhB + nhA)(1  )(yh   eyB)2   nhAC
,  (1  ) [nlB(yl   eyB)2 + (nhB + nhA)(yh   eyB)2]  nhAC
,  (1  ) [nlB (y2l + ey2B   2yleyB) + nh (y2h + ey2B   2yheyB)]  nhAC
,  (1  ) [(nlBy2l + nhy2h) + (nlB + nh) ey2B   2eyB (nlByl + nhyh)]  nhAC
,  (1  )
8>><>>:
(nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h) + (nlB + nh)

n2lBy
2
l + n
2
hy
2
h + 2nlBnhylyh
(nlB + nh)
2

 2

nlByl + nhyh
(nlB + nh)

(nlByl + nhyh)
9>>=>>;
 nhAC
,  (1 )
8><>:
(nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h)
+
n2lBy
2
l + n
2
hy
2
h + 2nlBnhylyh   2n2lBy2l   2nlBnhylyh   2nhnlBylyh   2n2hy2h
nlB + nh
9>=>;
 nhAC
,  (1  )

(nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
n2lBy
2
l + n
2
hy
2
h + 2nlBnhylyh
nlB + nh

  nhAC
,  (1  )
(
(nlBy
2
l + nhy
2
h) 
(nlByl + nhyh)
2
nlB + nh
)
  nhAC
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B.6 Utility when one side moves: lB + lA < 1
Proof. ,  (nlA + nlB)(1  )(yl   eyA)2   nhA(1  )(yh   eyA)2   nlBC
,  (1  ) [(nlA + nlB)(yl   eyA)2 + nhA(yh   eyA)2]  nlBC
,  (1  ) [nl (y2l + ey2A   2yleyA) + nhA (y2h + ey2A   2yheyA)]  nlBC
,  (1  ) [(nly2l + nhAy2h) + (nl + nhA) ey2A   2eyA (nlyl + nhAyh)]  nlBC
,  (1  )
8>><>>:
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) + (nl + nhA)

n2l y
2
l + n
2
hAy
2
h + 2nlnhAylyh
(nl + nhA)
2

 2

nlyl + nhAyh
(nl + nhA)

(nlyl + nhAyh)
9>>=>>;
 nlBC
,  (1 )
8><>:
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h)+
n2l y
2
l + n
2
hAy
2
h + 2nlnhAylyh   2n2l y2l   2nlnhAylyh   2nhAnlylyh   2n2hAy2h
nl + nhA
9>=>;
 nlBC
,  (1  )

(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
n2l y
2
l + n
2
hAy
2
h + 2nlnhAylyh
nl + nhA

  nlBC
,  (1  )
(
(nly
2
l + nhAy
2
h) 
(nlyl + nhAyh)
2
nl + nhA
)
  nlBC
B.7 Full Segregation function
Proof. , nlA
nA
nhA
nhA + nlB
+
nhB
nB
nlB
nhA + nlB
= 
, nBnlAnhA + nAnhBnlB = nAnB (nhA + nlB) 
, nBnlA (nA   nlA) + nA (nB   nlB)nlB = nAnB (nA   nlA + nlB) 
, nAnBnlA   nBn2lA + nAnBnlB   nAn2lB   n2AnB + nAnBnlA   nAnBnlB = 0
()  nBn2lA + [nAnB + nAnB]nlA + [nAnBnlB   nAn2lB   n2AnB   nAnBnlB] = 0
, nlA = 1 2nB
0B@   [nAnB + nAnB] +q
[nAnB + nAnB]
2 + 4  nB  [nAnBnlB   nAn2lB   n2AnB   nAnBnlB]
1CA
@nlA
@nlB
=
1
 2nB
1
2
1q
[nAnB + nAnB]
2 + 4  nB  [nAnBnlB   nAn2lB   n2AnB   nAnBnlB]
(4nAn
2
B   8nAnBnlB   4nAn2B)
) @nlA
@nlB
= 0, nlB = 4nAn
2
B(1  )
8nAnB
@2nlA
@n2lB
> 0
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B.8 Half Segregation function (<1)
Proof. , nhB
nB
  nhA
nA
nhA
nA + nlB
= 
, nA (nA + nlB) (nB   nlB)  nBn2hA = nAnB (nA + nlB) 
, n2AnB  n2AnlB +nAnBnlB  nAn2lB  nB(n2A+n2lA  2nAnlA) n2AnB nAnBnlB = 0
, n2AnB n2AnlB+nAnBnlB nAn2lB n2AnB nBn2lA+2nAnBnlA n2AnB nAnBnlB = 0
,  nBn2lA + 2nAnBnlA   [n2AnlB   nAnBnlB + nAn2lB + n2AnB + nAnBnlB] = 0
, nlA =  2nAnB +
p
4n2An
2
B   4  nB  [n2AnlB   nAnBnlB + nAn2lB + n2AnB + nAnBnlB]
 2nB
@nlA
@nlB
=
1
 2nB
1
2
1p
4n2An
2
B   4  nB  [n2AnlB   nAnBnlB + nAn2lB + n2AnB + nAnBnlB]
( 4n2AnB + 4nAn2B   8nAnBnlB   4nAn2B)
) @nlA
@nlB
= 0, nlB = (1  )nB   nA
2
@2nlA
@n2lB
> 0
B.9 Full rather than Half function (<1)
Proof. , nlA + nlB
nA + nlB
= 
, nlA + nlB = nA + nlB
, nlA = (   1)nlB + nA
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Part III
Social Identity, Advertising and
Market Competition
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1 Introduction
In everyday life, one observes groups of people who act in a similar way: they may listen to
the same type of music, buy the same good, etc. The fashion market ts this observation
particularly well. For example, fancy young men from rich neighborhoods all dress in the
same way, but completely di¤erently from people in poor neighborhoods or ghettos. In
school playgrounds, children naturally form groups according to the type of shoes or shirts
they wear, or the way their hair is cut.
In economics, di¤erent explanations have been proposed for similarity of consumption in-
side given groups. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) outline four possible mechanisms for uniform
behavior: rst, the possibility of sanctions on deviants leads to sustainability of norms (Kan-
dori, 1992), and hence similarity in behavior. For example, if someone lives in a very religious
neighborhood, not going to church may be sanctioned by unbearable social shame, leading
to uniform behavior in the group. The existence of positive payo¤ externalities is a second
way to explain uniform behavior. This is the case when using the same good makes exchange
possible (VHS versus BETAMAX systems, PC versus MAC, etc.). A third possibility is
linked to a matter of information: the idea here is that when choosing ones consumption,
not only is personal information important, but also the information held by others (revealed
by their actions). This e¤ect is explained in Banerjee (1992), where in a sequential game, the
action of a player is inuenced by those of his predecessors. Finally, conformity preference
may also lead to uniform behavior. This means that the choice of a consumer is guided by
the fact that he wants to consume the same good as other consumers (see for example Karni
and Schmeidler, 1990, who study, in a dynamic game, the demand for a good available in
three colors when the choices of others matter).
The study of consumption choice behavior has of course not been exclusively restricted
to economics. Sociology for example also investigates consumption behavior. In this eld,
consumption is seen as serving several purposes. Campbell (1995) outlines that besides the
role of satisfying needs or indulging wants and desires, consumption can also serve to com-
pensate the individual for feelings of inferiority, insecurity or loss, to symbolize achievement,
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success or power, to communicate social distinctions, etc. Among all these interpretations, an
interesting one is representing consumption as an activity which conveys information about
the consumers identity to those who witness it. For example, Zerubavel (1997) considers
that clothing may be a tool people use to be identied when meeting a stranger.
The notion of identity has been widely studied in sociology. Following Jenkins (2004),
identity is a matter of knowing whos who, that is, our understanding of who we are and
who other people are, and, reciprocally, other peoples understanding of themselves and of
others (which includes us). He also outlines that one of the rst things we do when meeting
others is to try to guess who they are, what their identity is, and that we work at presenting
ourselves so that others will work out who we are along the lines we wish them to. Similarly,
Go¤man (1959) argues that people seek to be and to be seen to be. Identity is then not only
about who we are and who others are, but also how others see us.
Coming back to Zerubavel (1997), the possibility of signalling means that not only is
the agents action of consumption important, but what this action means for agents inter-
acting with him also matters. Davis (1992) refers to this phenomenon as being captured
by the concept of social identity, which basically "concerns the conguration of attributes
and attitudes persons seek to and actually do communicate about themselves" (Davis, 1992,
p.16). For example, an agent of type  may choose to consume good x instead of good y
if consuming x allows others to identify him as being a    type. Besides this individual
approach, there is the social identity theory, which mainly focuses on groups: "[Social Iden-
tity Theory] starts from the assumption that social identity is derived primarily from group
memberships. It further proposes that people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social
identity (...), and that this positive identity derives largely from favorable comparisons that
can be made between the in-group and relevant out-groups" (Brown, 2000, p.746-747). Social
identity theory was rst developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and is composed of three
elements: categorization, identication, and comparison. The idea is that people classify
others into categories, identify themselves as belonging to one or many categories, and then
compare their situation to that of others (and derive positive utility from that comparison).
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Examples of categories are gender, race, ethnicity, etc. Of course, categories are not always
clear at rst sight, and signals may be needed. In that case, consumption choice can act as
a signal of type. Consumption then signals type through group membership, with the whole
group consuming the same good.
Based on social identity and social identity theory, an agent should choose a consumption
similar to agents from the same group/the same type, but distinct from out-groups/di¤erent
type, ensuring that his identity (characteristics) is well understood by others. This is obvi-
ously the case in the fancy young men versus people in ghettos example. Another example is
the dress code of someone who likes hard rock versus the clothes of a rap fan. In all of these
cases, clothes are indeed not just about keeping you warm or making you look beautiful, but
also, and above all, about signalling ones type in order to be matched with similar agents.
Note that in this paper we do not take into account any e¤ect such as in Pesendorfer (1995)
where agents tend to buy an expensive good to be matched with a high type agent, rather
than a low type. There is no vertical di¤erentiation between consumers, only horizontal
di¤erentiation. Furthermore, we do not consider any other group behavior explanations such
as herd behavior or peer pressure.
For the remainder of the paper, we refer to social identity as the fact that people value
being well understood by others and that they use consumption to signal who they are to
others.
The rst goal of this paper is to study the e¤ect of social identity, a specic form of
interpersonal relationships, on the market outcome. More precisely, we investigate how social
identity modies the classical result of the Bertrand price competition model. We then ask
ourselves how identity is linked to a given product. A possible answer studied in this paper
is the use of advertising by rms. Again, we look at how this feature, coupled with social
identity, modies the classical result that prices equal marginal costs. The idea behind the
advertising e¤ect is that rms can create an image for their product, focussing on specic
consumers, which in turn ensures a rigid demand. For example, Coke Light is targeted at
women, Jupiler beer at men, and Seat cars are targeted at young people. Note that we do not
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consider any fashion e¤ect, which would mean that someone consumes a good not because
its characteristics are in line with his type, but because others are doing it, but some kind of
"anti-fashion" e¤ect, i.e. consumers dislike others consuming the same good. Of course, we
allow rms to not advertise at all. This can be interpreted as a "no brand" product.
The literature presents three di¤erent views on the role played by advertising: informa-
tive, persuasive and complementary (see Bagwell, 2007). The informative view states that
advertising provides information about the existence of the good, its price and/or quality,
etc. This view depicts advertising as a way to increase the quality of matching between
agents and goods. It should increase competition, and hence lower prices on the market and
increase the elasticity of demand as well as entry. The persuasive view, on the other hand,
considers advertising as having an anti-competitive e¤ect, increasing the price and decreasing
elasticity, by altering consumerstastes. The complementary view regards advertising and
the good which is advertised as complements in the utility function. According to this view,
consuming a good which is advertised yields utility through the consumption of the good,
but also through the image of the good created by the advertising. Empirically, however, the
e¤ects of advertising on various dimensions such as price, quantity, quality, entry and brand
loyalty are uncertain, as they depend on the sector and the good which is considered.
Our model is based on both social identity and advertising. The notion of identity has
not really been studied by economists, except by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their paper,
they consider a utility function that depends on both agentsactions and identity. Identity is
modeled as the fact that agents categorize others and are categorized, and that agents expect
specic behavior from each category. They give various examples on how identity a¤ects the
utility of the agents through their own actions as well as those of others. As far as advertising
is concerned, we rely on some existing studies that modelize situations similar to those we
consider. In an extension of the Dorfman-Steiner Model, Bagwell (2007) uses a model in
which the valuation of the product by agents depends on the type of the agent (vertical
di¤erentiation of type) and on advertising. A monopoly rm can then inuence valuation.
The main results are in line with the persuasive view since an increase in advertisement leads
76
to a decrease in elasticity and an increase in price. In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), products
are horizontally di¤erentiated by the distance between an agent and rms. Firms can provide
costly and random information about the existence of the product and its price. In line with
the informative view, they nd that increasing the level of advertising leads to an increase in
price elasticity and a decrease in price. In Meurer and Stahl (1994) two rms produce two
di¤erentiated goods. Each agent is a good match with one of the two products, and has the
same reservation value as everyone. Firms can provide information through advertising. The
authors outline that advertising has a non monotonic e¤ect on social surplus. The intuition
behind this is that advertising increases information, hence the number of good matches, but
on the other hand, it increases product di¤erentiation and market power, which makes rms
increase their price, and thus reduces expected sales.
Our model considers a duopoly in which each rm produces one good. Both goods have
the same intrinsic value for agents and are perfect substitutes as long as neither signals a
consumers type. Indeed, an agents valuation of a good depends on both social interactions
and advertising. Consumption is used to signal types, in such a way that agents get utility
if their type is well understood by others. Since only two goods are available, agents have
to form groups, and the more heterogenous a group, the less utility agents obtain since
their type cannot be deduced with precision. Hence, an agent will choose the good which is
consumed by the group that is the closest to him in terms of type. Firms choose to produce
a costly exogenously xed level of advertising or not (we assume that they cannot choose
its level), and determine the targeted type (the type on the basis of which the advertising
is designed). For agents, consuming an advertised good is valuable. By choosing or not to
advertise and its target, rms can then inuence agentsvaluations. Our model thus includes
aspects from both the complementary and persuasive views. The complementary view is
taken into account by the fact that we introduce a parameter which translates agentstaste
for advertising. The persuasive view will be introduced by way of the targeted market theory,
in which advertising is centered on some specic types which will buy the good since it seems
to be perfect for them. Although goods are undi¤erentiated, social identity and advertising
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create di¤erentiation.
The main results are the following: taking social identity into account leads to higher
prices and prots for rms compared to the classical Bertrand price competition model,
as well as to the formation of groups. This process leads to multiple equilibria, each of
which corresponds to a particular partition of types (section 3). By adding advertising
to the problem, agents become able to coordinate on some particular equilibria. On the
other hand, this increases market power for rms, implying higher prices and prots. The
type and the number of equilibria depend on the cost of advertising as well as the value of
advertising to agents (section 4). Obviously, there always exist equilibria in which both rms
advertise (when advertising costs are low enough) and in which no rm advertises (for high
advertisement costs). On top of this, for low values of advertising, only symmetric equilibria
can arise, with the possibility of multiple equilibria for medium advertising costs. If the value
of advertising is high enough, then asymmetric equilibria can arise. We may then end up with
one rm targeting its advertising toward the average type, and the other being considered
as a "no-brand" rm. The various equilibria are a result of a combination of three e¤ects:
the competition e¤ect, which leads rms to decrease their prices, the market stealing e¤ect,
which corresponds to the use of advertising by rms in order to take some of the market
share of others, and the decrease in price elasticity due to the presence of social identity as
well as advertising. We also investigate welfare, and we show that, depending on the value
of advertising, it is optimal from the aggregate consumer welfare point of view to have zero,
one or two rms advertising. At the individual level, we show that some consumers may lose,
while others may gain from advertising (section 5).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model. In section 3,
we develop a model of social identity, analyzing the formation of groups and price competition
between rms. Advertising is introduced in section 4. Welfare implications of the presence of
both social identity and advertising are investigated in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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2 Setup of the model
We consider an economy with a continuum of agents of mass one. Each agent i has a type
i, which is privately known and uniformly distributed on [0; 1]1: Agents are sorted according
to their types. Two goods are produced in the economy: a and b. Each consumer buys one
unit of one of the goods. There are two rms. Firm A produces good a, and rm B produces
good b. Both rms use the same production technology and have the same cost structure.
The marginal cost is equal to c, which is, for simplicity, normalized to 0. There are no xed
costs. a and b are perfect substitutes and perfectly undi¤erentiated, as long as there is no
social identity or advertising. a (b) is sold at a unit price pa (pb). Each rm may also decide
to advertise at cost  and with a target k. Firms choose prices and advertising targets in
order to maximize prot, which is given by
j =
8><>: pjqj    if rm j advertisespjqj otherwise
The timing of the game is the following: rst, rms choose simultaneously to advertise
or not, as well as their advertising targets. Then, rms compete in prices. Finally, agents
choose one of the goods, on the basis of the price, social identity theory mentioned earlier,
as well as advertising.
As already explained, the idea behind social identity is that agents use consumption
behavior to signal who they are to others, getting more utility if the type is well understood
(remember the example of a hard rock fan wearing specic clothes which are completely
di¤erent from those of a rap fan). Since the number of goods is limited, and given the
absence of any outside option, groups will be formed. The more heterogenous a group, the
less utility agents get, since their type cannot be inferred with precision. Although goods are
initially undi¤erentiated, social identity then acts as a di¤erentiating tool on goods, given
that it modies the value of the good for consumers. Hence, when choosing a consumption
1Another possibility would be to put consumers on a circle. However, computations then become much
more complicated.
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good, agents consider not only the price of each good, but also who else consumes that good
in order to choose the good consumed by the group in which memberstypes are the closest
to his own. To take into account this aspect, we need a utility function which reects the
composition of groups consuming a given good. Dene 	(k) as the set of agents consuming
good k 2 fa; bg. The social identity part of the utility of agent i consuming good k is then
given by
 
Z
fj :j2	(k)g
ji   j d
The latter expression reaches its maximum value in two situations: rst if agent i is the only
one who is consuming good k; second, if all agents consuming good k have exactly the same
type. In both cases, this function is in line with the social identity theory since reaching the
maximum value means that the type of agent i is well identied by others. On the contrary,
the more 	(k) is heterogenous, the lower the utility.
Advertising is introduced in the following way. If a rm decides to advertise (at a xed
level and a xed cost ), it must choose a type (k) toward which the advertising is targeted.
The idea is that the good is intrinsically the same for everyone, but the image created
by advertising inuences valuations in function of types. The further a type is from the
advertising target, the less utility he gets from consuming that good. This comes from the
literature on advertising, more precisely from the target market theory (see for example
Aaker et al., 2000). This theory is based on the user positioning approach, in which a brand
is closely associated with a particular user or customer. In line with the persuasive view,
persuasion is enhanced by a match between the characteristics of the advertisement and those
of the consumer, relative to when there is no such match. On the contrary, people in the
nontarget market fail to buy the good since their type is not targeted by advertising, leading
those agents to consider that their tastes are such that the good "is not for them". On top of
this target market e¤ect, we also assume that advertising generates a positive gain for agents
consuming the advertised good. This is coherent with the complementary view of advertising
and implies that not only does the targeted type has an incentive to buy the good, but so do
a range of types around him. The advertising part of the utility of agent i consuming good
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k is then given by
Ik(  ji   kj)
where  represents the intrinsic utility of advertising (taste for advertising). Ik is an indicator
function which takes the value 1 if good k is advertised, and 0 otherwise. We further assume
that the set of possible advertising targets is limited to
n
0;  1
2
; 1
o
. One can interpret this as
the fact that rms cannot discriminate exactly between all types. As a consequence, potential
targets are limited. Moreover, it seems natural that rms can target the two extremes as well
as the center (average) more easily. However, modifying the potential targets (for examplen
 1
4
;  1
2
;  3
4
o
) does not change the results signicantly.
Putting the two parts together, and subtracting the price of the good (pk), the utility
function of agent i choosing good k (k 2 fa; bg) is then
Ui(k) = Ik(  ji   kj) 
Z
fj :j2	(k)g
ji   j d   pk
3 A model of Social Identity
In a rst step, we investigate how social identity a¤ects the equilibrium in terms of prices,
quantities, and prots, and how it drives the formation of groups.
As mentioned earlier, due to the limited number of goods and the absence of any outside
option, groups will be created by the consumption choice of agents. Formation of groups
means here that the continuum of types is partitioned into subsets, inside each of which
agents consume the same good, in such a way that no one has an incentive to change his
consumption. In other words, looking for groups means looking for an equilibrium partition
of the continuum. Each group is a convex set of strictly positive measure of buyers consuming
the same good. For a given number of subsets n, we must then determine the n  1 cuto¤s
such that Ui(k) = Ui( k);8i 2 f1; 2; :::; n  1g ; k 2 fa; bg. We denote by 1; :::; n 1 the
n  1 indi¤erent consumers. However, solving the problem for any possible n leads to many
technical di¢ culties. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the possibility
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of having two or three groups (the possibility of having one group will appear in the next
section).2
For each number of group, we rst do not take into account price competition by rms
(we consider prices as exogenously given) and advertising, but focus only on the formation
of groups. As a result, the utility function is limited to Ui(k) =  
R
fj :j2	(k)g ji   j d  pk.
In a second step, we introduce price competition, based on the groups formed through social
identity.
3.1 Two groups
If there are two groups (n = 2), we assume without loss of generality that groups of con-
sumption divide [0; 1] following a sequence a  b. The indi¤erent consumer 1 is such that
 
Z 1
0
(1   )d   pa =  
Z 1
1
(   1)d   pb
implying
1 =
1
2
  (pa   pb)
Knowing the consumer behavior, a rm maximizes its prot by setting its price, taking
into account the other rms behavior. Hence, prot functions of rm A and rm B are
respectively
A(pa j pb) = pa

1
2
  (pa   pb)

= pa

1
2
 p

and
B(pb j pa) = pb

1 

1
2
 p

The best response functions are then given by
8><>: pa =
1+2pb
4
pa =
 1+4pb
2
2Results for larger values of n are available upon request.
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meaning that equilibrium prices, quantities and prots are
pa = p

b =
1
2
= qa = q

b
A = 

B =
1
4
3.2 Three groups
If there are three groups (n = 3), we assume without loss of generality that groups of
consumption divide [0; 1] following a sequence a  b  a3. The indi¤erent consumers 1 and
2 are such that8><>:  
R 1
0
(1   ) d  
R 1
2
(   1) d   pa =  
R 2
1
(   1)d   pb
  R 1
0
(2   ) d  
R 1
2
(   2) d   pa =  
R 2
1
(2   )d   pb
, 8><>:  
R 1
0
(1   ) d  
R 1
2
(   1) d  
h
  R 2
1
(   1)d
i
= pa   pb
  R 1
0
(2   ) d  
R 1
2
(   2) d  
h
  R 2
1
(2   )d
i
= pa   pb
,
 
Z 1
0
(1   ) d  
Z 1
2
(   1) d  

 
Z 2
1
(   1)d

=  
Z 1
0
(2   ) d  
Z 1
2
(   2) d  

 
Z 2
1
(2   )d

,
 1 + 1 + 2 = 0
,
2 = 1  1
3Reversing this assumption just reverses the results below.
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Hence, at equilibrium, 1 is such that
 
Z 1
0
(1   ) d  
Z 1
1 1
(   1) d   pa =  
Z 1 1
1
(   1)d   pb
that is
1 =
1
6

3 
p
3
p
1 + 4 (pa   pb)

Prot functions of rm A and B are respectively
A(pa j pb) = pa (21)
B(pb j pa) = pb (1  21)
The best response functions are then given by
8><>: pa =
1
6
p
2
p
1  2pb + 4pb
pa =
1
4
( 1 + 6pb)
Solving this system leads to equilibrium prices, hence to equilibrium quantities and prots.
pa =
2 + 3
p
6
25
<
1
2
pb =
11 + 4
p
6
50
<
1
2
qa =
2
15

6 
p
6

<
1
2
qb =
1
15

3 + 2
p
6

>
1
2
A =
4
375

 3 + 8
p
6

<
1
4
B =
1
750

81 + 34
p
6

<
1
4
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3.3 Equilibria
Let us compare the di¤erent results. First, with respect to the classical result of the Bertrand
price competition model, prices and prots are higher in both cases. This comes from the
fact that social identity creates rigidities on the market, hence, market power for rms. This
is one of the main results of the paper. The explanation for this is the following: in Bertrand,
goods are undi¤erentiated, meaning that consumers only care about relative prices. Here,
social identity gives some value to the good depending on who consumes it. Hence, initially
undi¤erentiated goods are in fact di¤erentiated by consumption: social identity acts as a
di¤erentiating tool on goods.
Second, we have multiple equilibria, in the sense that for each n, there exists an equilib-
rium partition of the continuum as well as equilibrium prices and prots. However, these are
di¤erent in terms of prices and prots. When n = 2, equilibrium prices and quantities are
equal to 1
2
and prots are equal to 1
4
. When n = 3, prices and prots are smaller than when
n = 2, while the quantity is larger for one rm and smaller for the other one. The expla-
nation for this is the following. When n = 2, each rm "owns" exactly half of the market,
each rm owing one extreme of the continuum, while when n = 3, one rm "owns" the two
"extreme" subsets. This means that rms in the odd case are more exposed to competition.
Hence, it is the structure of partitioning that increases competition in the odd case, leading
to lower prices: when there are three subsets, good b is only consumed in the central subset,
while good a is consumed in the two extreme subsets. This means that the group of people
consuming b is more homogenous than the group consuming a. Hence, rm B has more
market power than A, which leads to higher price and quantity for rm B.
Proposition 1 A model including social identity and price competition leads to the forma-
tion of groups as well as to higher prices and prots compared to the classical Bertrand price
competition model.
Concerning consumerstotal surplus, the total surplus (TS) for n = 2 is   7
12
, while for
n = 3 it is  777 178
p
6
2250
, so it is better in terms of consumerstotal surplus to have three subsets
than only two. This result is clearly linked to the di¤erence in competition outlined above.
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In order to ensure that the reader understands clearly what we are talking about, let us
consider the following example. Adidas and Bellerose are two rms that produce sweatshirts
among other things. Basically, the sweatshirts are the same: they are available in almost the
same colors and the same design, they both are equally warm, etc. However, people wearing
Adidas sweatshirts are usually not the same as those who wear Bellerose sweatshirts. The idea
is that the brand you wear will signal who you are to others. Hence, groups of consumption
have been created. One way this signal can be created is by advertising, which focuses the
image of the good on a particular type of agents, each rm targeting a di¤erent type of
consumer. This possibility is investigated in the next two sections: section 4 presents a
model including social identity as well as advertising, with the objective of describing rms
equilibrium behavior in terms of advertising. Section 5 studies the welfare implications of
having both social identity and advertising, at the aggregate level as well as at the individual
level.
4 Social Identity, Advertising andMarket Competition
As we just showed, in the absence of coordination, social identity leads to multiple equilibria.
We now allow rms to advertise in order to create an image for the good. For the simplicity
of the analysis, we restrict ourselves, for the benchmark case, to considering only the case
with two groups if no advertising takes place. This assumption does not generate any result
which would not exist if we were also considering three groups. Every result would hold
qualitatively. Moreover, given that rmsprots are higher with two groups than with three
groups, taking the two group case as a benchmark means considering the lower bound for
rms to advertise.
Remember that with two groups, the presence of social identity in the utility function
increases prices and prots, in such a way that
A = B =
1
4
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We now add the possibility for rms to advertise. We then do not only have to take
into account the e¤ect of social identity, but also how advertising modies the formation of
groups and prices on the market. On top of the possibility of "no advertising", each rm
can choose between three advertising targets:
n
0;  1
2
; 1
o
. Since there are two rms, 16
possible situations may arise, which are represented in Table I below. In order to keep things
simple, we lower the number of cases to study by making two assumptions: rst, if only
one rm advertises, we call it rm B4. Second, if both rms advertise, then, again without
loss of generality, we set b 6 a. Note that by symmetry, fa = ;; b = 0g is the same as
fa = ;; b = 1g, so we do not need to investigate the latter.
The remainder of section 4 is organized as follows: subsections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 analyze
the di¤erent rmsstrategies. Subsection 4.4 studies rmsequilibrium behavior.
For each case, the table indicates the section in which the situation is analyzed.
Firm B
b = ; b = 0 b = 12 b = 1
a = ; Section 3 4:1:1 4:1:2 :
F irm A a = 0 : 4:3 : :
a =
1
2
: 4:2:1 4:3 :
a = 1 : 4:2:2: 4:2:3 4:3
Table I: Strategy of each rm
We start by analyzing cases in which only one rm advertises, that is fa = ;; b = 0g
and

a = ;; b = 12
	
. We then investigate cases where both rms advertise, but use di¤erent
targets:

a =
1
2
; b = 0
	
, fa = 1; b = 0g,

a = 1; b =
1
2
	
. Finally, we look at cases in
which both rms choose the same target. Once this is done, we look for Nash equilibria in
all cases.
4This assumption implies that when we will study Nash equilibria, we will only look at rm B potentially
deviating from the "no advertising" equilibrium, and if B advertises, we will look at how A behaves. This is
done without loss of generality, other cases yield results symmetric to the ones we obtain.
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4.1 One rm advertises
4.1.1 If a = ; and b = 0
Lemma 1 If only one rm advertises, with an advertising targeted at one endpoint of the
continuum [0; 1], the partition is composed of exactly two subsets.
Proof. See appendix
This rst case is asymmetric, since one rm advertises but the other does not. Moreover,
the target chosen by the rm is the extreme left of the continuum. Adding advertising
modies the problem considerably, since agents now have a coordination tool.
The indi¤erent consumers type i is given by
  i  
Z i
0
(i   )d   pb =  
Z 1
i
(   i)d   pa
which allows to compute the market share of each rm
qa =
3
2
  (  pa + pb)
2
qb =
1
2
+   pa + pb
2
Since each rm maximizes its prot by choosing its price, given the price of the other rm
and the value of , the two best response functions are
BRA : p
opt
b =
 3
2
+ + 2popta
BRB : p
opt
b =
1
4
 
1 + 2+ 2popta

Solving the price system leads to (with pa;bi the price of rm i when rm A chooses a and
rm B chooses b)
p;;0a =
7  2
6
p;;0b =
5 + 2
6
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corresponding quantities are
q;;0a =
7  2
12
q;;0b =
5 + 2
12
and the rmsprots are given by
;;0A =
(7  2)2
72
;;0B =
(5 + 2)2
72
  
Analyzing these results, we rst observe that even if  = 1, i.e. that no one su¤ers from
a negative e¤ect of advertising, the market share of B is not 1. This is due to the arbitrage
agents face between the taste for advertising and the taste for similarity when interacting.
Second, advertising adds rigidities in prices to those created by the presence of social identity.
Indeed, for each ; p;;0b > p
;;;
b and for each  < 2; p
;;0
a > p
;;;
a . Third, if  >
1
2
, groupB is larger
than half of the population (i.e. q;;0b > q
;;0
a ), and p
;;0
b > p
;;0
a . This means that the majority
of the population buys the more expensive good because of the combination of advertising
and social identity. An explanation for this result is that if the taste for advertising is high
enough, the rm using advertising steals some of the market share of the other rm (this
market share stealing e¤ect is dened as the fact that, because of the taste for advertising,
a rm which advertises its good can attract new consumers). Fourth, the use of advertising
by a rm generates a prot externality for the other rm, whose sign depends on the size of
. Indeed, if  < 7 3
p
2
2
, then the externality is positive, the underlying idea being that the
taste for advertising is not high enough so the e¤ect of stealing some of the market share is
smaller than the increase in market power for both rms. Fifth, note that the minority is
better o¤ in terms of social interactions than in the no advertising case, but the price it has
to pay is higher, as soon as  < 2. Finally, if  > 7
2
, rm B covers the whole market.
To sum up these e¤ects, the use of advertising by a rm creates a decrease in price
elasticity for this rm, leading to a higher prot. This e¤ect will also a¤ect the other rm,
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thanks to an externality e¤ect, but providing that the taste for advertising is not too high.
Indeed, if the taste for advertising is high, then the market stealing e¤ect becomes more
important than the externality e¤ect, and the non-advertising rm is forced to decrease its
price in order to retain a positive market share.
4.1.2 If a = ; and b = 12
Lemma 2 If only one rm advertises, with an advertising targeted at the center of the con-
tinuum [0; 1], the partition is composed of three subsets, with two symmetric indi¤erent con-
sumers.
Proof. See appendix
This case is similar to the previous one, in the sense that only one rm advertises. How-
ever, the target is located at the center of the continuum. Three groups will now be formed,
consumers in the central one consume the advertised good.
Computing the rst cuto¤, using the demand side equilibrium condition leads to
0 =
1
3
(2 
p
1 + 3pa   3pb + 3)
Since each rm maximizes its prot by choosing its price, given the price of the other rm
and the value of , the two best response functions are obtained, i.e.
BRA : p
opt
a =
2
27

1 + 9poptb   9+ 2
q
7  9poptb + 9

BRB : p
opt
a =
1
24

 7 + 36poptb +
q
1 + 24poptb   24

Solving the price system, prices are
p
;; 1
2
a =
1
135

37  54+ 3p45 + 60+ 2
p
10
q
43 + 54  3p45 + 60

p
;; 1
2
b =
1
30

9 + 12+
p
15
p
3 + 4

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and quantities
q
;; 1
2
a =
4
3
  1
9
r
2
5
r
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4
p
10
q
43 + 54  3p45 + 60
q
;; 1
2
b =
1
45
 
 15 +
p
10
r
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4
p
10
q
43 + 54  3p45 + 60
!
The prot of each rm is given by

;; 1
2
A =  
1
6075
0B@

37  54+ 3p45 + 60+ 2p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60


 60 +p10
q
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60

1CA

;; 1
2
B =
1
1350
0B@
 
9 + 12+
p
45 + 60

 15 +p10
q
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60

1CA  
Most observations made above remain valid. In particular, the market stealing e¤ect still
appears, but for lower values of . Indeed, as soon as  > 3
16
, rm B sells more than rm A,
and at a higher price. Similarly, now rm B owns the whole market as soon as  = 3. These
two results are di¤erent from the previous ones since the advertising target is now located in
the middle of the continuum. Hence, the market power of the advertising rm is stronger.
4.1.3 Firm Bs optimal strategy if A does not advertise
To investigate this, we have to compare the prot made by rm B when the target is,
respectively, b = 0 and b = 12 (remember that b = 1 is symmetric to b = 0). First, note
that @
;;0
B
@
> 0 and @
;; 12
B
@
> 0 . Second, we also have that ;;0B ( = 0) > 
;; 1
2
B ( = 0) and
;;0B ( = 3) < 
;; 1
2
B ( = 3). Third, 
;;0
B and 
;; 1
2
B cross only once on the interval  2 [0; 3].
Lemma 3 90 2 [0; 3] such that
if  6 0 : ;;0B > 
;; 1
2
B
if  > 0 : ;;0B < 
;; 1
2
B
The interpretation of the result is the following: if  is not too high, the market stealing
e¤ect is too weak with respect to the price competition e¤ect. In this case, targeting the
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center of the continuum is not su¢ ciently protable for rm B (in terms of market power),
while, by choosing to locate at the border, rm B is protected against part of the price
competition e¤ect. If, on the other hand,  is high enough, then being fully exposed to the
price competition e¤ect is not too bad since the market stealing e¤ect is high.
4.2 Both rms advertise using di¤erent targets
Lemma 4 When both rms advertise using di¤erent targets there are exactly two subsets.
Proof. See appendix
When both rms advertise, they both have to choose an advertising target on the con-
tinuum. Remember that we only study cases in which b 6 a, meaning, in this section, that
b < a.
We are looking for the indi¤erent consumer, i.e.
  ji   bj  
Z i
0
(i   )d   pb =   ji   aj  
Z 1
i
(   i)d   pa (1)
Market shares for both rms are then given by
qa =
5
2
  (a + b)  pa + pb
3
qb =
1
2
+ (a + b) + pa   pb
3
Since each rm maximizes its prot by choosing its price, given the price of the other
rm, the value of  and both advertising targets, the two best response functions are
BRA : p
opt
a =
5 + 2pb   2 (a + b)
4
BRB : p
opt
a =  
1
2
+ 2pb   2 (a + b)
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Solving the price system, we obtain
pa;ba =
11  2(a + b)
6
pa;bb =
7 + 2(a + b)
6
corresponding quantities are
qa;ba =
11  2(a + b)
18
qa;bb =
7 + 2(a + b)
18
The prot of each rm is then given by
a;bA =
(11  2(a + b))2
108
  
a;bB =
(7 + 2(a + b))
2
108
  
4.2.1 If a = 12 and b = 0
With these targets, we have
a =
1
2
; b = 0
p
1
2
;0
a =
10
6
; p
1
2
;0
b =
8
6
q
1
2
;0
a =
10
18
; q
1
2
;0
b =
8
18

1
2
;0
A =
100
108
  ; 
1
2
;0
B =
64
108
  
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4.2.2 If a = 1 and b = 0
With these targets, we have
a = 1; 

b = 0
p1;0a =
9
6
; p1;0b =
9
6
q1;0a =
1
2
; q1;0b =
1
2
1;0A =
81
108
  ; 1;0B =
81
108
  
4.2.3 If a = 1 and b = 12
With these targets, we have
a = 1; 

b =
1
2
p
1; 1
2
a =
8
6
; p
1; 1
2
b =
10
6
q
1; 1
2
a =
8
18
; q
1; 1
2
b =
10
18

1; 1
2
A =
64
108
  ; 1;
1
2
B =
100
108
  
Obviously fa = 1; b = 0g will never be an equilibrium since each rm has an incentive
to deviate. Hence, only

a =
1
2
; b = 0
	
and

a = 1; b =
1
2
	
can potentially be equilibria.
In each case, one rm targets the border of the continuum, and the other one the center.
The "border rm" sells a smaller quantity but at a higher price than when there is only
social identity. The "central rm" exhibits both a higher price and a higher quantity than
in the benchmark case. Hence, advertising increases prices, by creating market power for
rms, but the e¤ect on quantities depends on the position of the advertising (note here that
the market stealing e¤ect disappears since both rms advertise, meaning that the taste for
advertising no longer plays any role). Moreover, the "central rm" obtains a higher prot
than the "border rm". Of course, the nal decision to advertise or not depends crucially on
the size of the advertising cost.
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4.3 Both rms advertise using the same target
In this case, advertising no longer signals anything. Indeed, when choosing the same target,
rms modify the problem in equation (1) in the sense that advertising disappears from the
problem, meaning that we are back to the case where only the social identity e¤ect takes
place, thereby leading to the same prices and quantities, but to smaller prots since rms
have to pay the advertising cost. Since, in the best possible case, rms have a prot of 1
4
, it
is obvious that targeting the same type is never an equilibrium.
4.4 Equilibrium behavior
So far, we have shown that fa = b 6= ;g and fa = 1; b = 0g are not equilibria. Let us
take a look at the other cases. Remember that in case of social identity when there is no
advertising and an even number of groups, prots are
;;;A = 
;;;
B =
1
4
This is an equilibrium if no rm has an incentive to deviate, i.e. to advertise. Firm B
will decide to advertise its good, that is, to deviate from no advertising if the payo¤ it gets
from advertising is higher than by not, given than A does not advertise5. Moreover, rm B
also has to decide which advertising target to choose. Hence, to see if B deviates or not, we
need to look at two di¤erent expressions, each one corresponding to one advertising target.
1 = 
;;0
B +   
1
4
2 = 
;; 1
2
B +   
1
4
Note that 1and 2 respectively share the same specicities as 
;;0
B and 
;; 1
2
B . Firm B
then advertises if one of the two i is larger than . If both i are larger than , B chooses
the target corresponding to the i with the highest value. If, on the other hand, both
5This comes from the assumption that if only one rm advertises, it is rm B. This is done without loss
of generality, symmetric results can be found by assuming that rm A unilaterally deviates
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expressions are smaller than , the equilibrium is a situation in which no rm advertises. If
B chooses to advertise, we still have to check if A also chooses to advertise to characterize
the equilibrium. Depending on the target chosen by B, A advertises if the corresponding
expression is larger than .
3 = 
1; 1
2
A +    
;; 1
2
A
4 = 
1
2
;0
A +    ;;0A
If one of these last two i is larger than , we end up in an equilibrium in which both rms
advertise. Otherwise, we have an asymmetric equilibrium in which one rm advertises, and
the other one does not. 1and 2 are two increasing and convex functions, while 3 and 4
are increasing but concave functions. Note also that
1 ( = 0) < 2 ( = 0) < 3 ( = 0) < 4 ( = 0) (2)
3 ( = 3) < 4 ( = 3) < 2 ( = 3) < 1 ( = 3)
In fact, 4 > 3 8 > 0, which can be interpreted as follows: when both rms advertise,
it is always better for rm A to choose a = 12 if possible. By Proposition 3, we know that
there exists 0 such that 2 (0) = 1 (0). Moreover, we have
1 (
0) = 2 (0) < 3 (0) < 4 (0) (3)
By the properties of the 0s and (2) and (3), there exists 00 > 0 such that 2 (00) =
3 (
00), which leads to Proposition 4.
Proposition 2 90 < 0 < 00 < 3 such that
1) For  : 0 6  < 0
if  > 4 : no rm advertises
if  < 2 : both rms advertise and fa; bg =

1
2
; 0
	
if 2 6  6 4 : there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, no rm advertises. In the
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other, fa; bg =

1
2
; 0
	
2) For  : 0 6  < 00
if  > 3 : no rm advertises
if  < 1 : both rms advertise and fa; bg =

1; 1
2
	
if 1 6  6 3 : there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, no rm advertises. In the
other, fa; bg =

1; 1
2
	
3) For  : 00 6  6 3
if  > 1 : no rm advertises
if  < 3 : both rms advertise and fa; bg =

1; 1
2
	
if 3 6  6 1 : there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which only one rm advertises:
fa; bg =
;; 1
2
	
These equilibria are represented in Figure I
Figure I: Equilibria
Let us now turn to the interpretation of Proposition 2. For low values of , as already
explained, if rm B advertises, it chooses b = 0. Indeed, choosing b = 12 is worse since the
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decrease in price elasticity and the market stealing e¤ect created by advertising are not high
enough to overcome the higher price competition e¤ect when the advertising target is located
at the middle of the continuum. Hence, if rm A decides to advertise, it chooses a = 12 :
Results for high and low values of  are quite intuitive. If the advertising cost is too high,
no one has an incentive to invest in advertising. On the other hand, a low advertising cost
implies that both rms advertise. Multiple equilibria arise for medium values of  since, given
the low value of , rm B may not have an incentive to move and start an advertising project,
meaning that no one deviates from the no-advertising equilibrium. However, suppose both
rms advertise, then the prot of A may be high enough to prevent this rm from ceasing
to advertise. A similar reasoning explains results for average values of , with the di¤erence
that now  is high enough for rm B to choose b = 12 , meaning that rm A has to choose
a = 1. For high values of , the incentive for rm B to invest in advertising is strong, and
becomes stronger with  when A does not advertise. On the contrary, the incentive for rm
A to advertise when B advertises is bounded below the level of incentive for B6. Hence, there
exists a range of values of  such that B advertises, but not A, given the advertising cost and
the limit on the advertising incentive7. Of course, results for really high and low levels of 
still exist. Once again, we want to underline the fact that in this "Equilibrium Behavior"
section we only look at the possibility for B to deviate (or not) unilaterally from the "no-
advertising" equilibrium. This assumption is simply meant to ensure that the reasoning is
not too complicated, and it generates no loss of generality, since one can nd all the other
results (i.e. when A deviates from the "no-advertising" equilibrium) by symmetry.
Our model, more precisely this section about advertising, yields several interesting results:
rst, we showed that there exist equilibria in which rms use advertising in order to increase
their prots. This is partly due to the parameter measuring the taste for advertising, but
not only. Indeed, advertising also acts as a coordination tool for consumers, which in turn
creates more market power for rms. Beyond the trivial cases in which both rms advertise
(for low advertising costs) or do not (for high advertising costs), our model also generates
6This comes from the fact that when both rms advertise,  no longer plays any role.
7Again, the same result exists for A advertising but not B.
98
multiple equilibria, as well as an asymmetric equilibrium. The latter arises for high values of
taste for advertising, and average advertising costs. This equilibrium may explain why there
are cases in which one rm advertises, focussing on the average type, while the other behaves
as a "no brand" product.
5 Consumer welfare implications
After computing the di¤erent equilibria, we now investigate how consumer welfare is a¤ected
by advertising. To do this, we use the utilitarian denition of welfare, and split the problem
into two parts. First, what is the e¤ect of advertising on aggregate consumer welfare? Second,
what is the individual e¤ect on agents?
5.1 Aggregate consumer welfare
We start by evaluating total consumer welfare when there is no advertising. This does not
lead to a unique solution since, as outlined above, when there is no coordination device,
multiple equilibria exist, each one corresponding to a particular partition of the continuum.
Letting W be the total consumer welfare, we have in the case of no advertising
W 0(2 groups) =   7
12
W 0(3 groups) =
 777  178p6
2250
If both rms advertise, we have a unique solution (for reasons of symmetry), and total
consumer welfare is given by
W 2 =   593
324
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Finally, if only one rm advertises, we have
W 1 =
1
72900
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
 49005  1620p45 + 60  1080p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60
+436
p
10
q
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60
+10

 3p6p3 + 4+ 8
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60


q
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60
+108

270 +
p
10
q
83 + 54  3p45 + 60+ 4p10
p
43 + 54  3p45 + 60

1CCCCCCCCCCCA
Note that W 1 and W 2 are increasing in . Moreover, W 0( = 0) > W 1( = 0) >
W 2( = 0) and W 2( = 3) > W 1( = 3) > W 0( = 3). Hence, there are three zones, each
dening a range of  in which it is optimal, from the point of view of aggregate consumer
welfare, that respectively no rm advertises, one rm advertises or both rms advertise.
Proposition 3 9 ;  : 0 <  <  < 3 such that
1) 8 6 , it is optimal for aggregate consumer welfare that no rm advertises
2) 8 <  6 , it is optimal for aggregate consumer welfare that only one rm adver-
tises
3) 8 > , it is optimal for aggregate consumer welfare that both rms advertise
This result is illustrated by Figure II.
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Figure II: Welfare
For low values of , advertising generates benets for very few people, those located
around the advertising target, while most are hurt by it. Moreover, advertising creates
market rigidities, thus higher prices. This means that the cost of advertising for consumers
is really higher than its benet. For average levels of , the benet of advertising is positive
for more people. However, it is still too small to overcome the rigidities created when both
rms advertise. Having only one rm advertise is then optimal. Finally, for high values of ,
the benet of advertising is high enough so it becomes optimal for consumers if both rms,
although advertising increases prices. The reason for that is that, if only one rm advertises,
the price would be much more high since it would depend on , which is not the case when
both rms advertise.
Putting the results we have here together with those obtained when studying rmsop-
timal behavior, it is clear that whatever the value of , given that rms take their decisions
based on both the value of the taste for advertising by consumers as well as on the cost of
advertising, these decisions may be optimal or not for consumers, depending on the cost of
advertising. For example, if the cost of advertising is low, both rms will advertise their
goods. If  is low, this decision will not be optimal from the point of view of consumers.
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If, on the other hand,  is high, then the decision to advertise is optimal for both rms and
consumers. The same reasoning applies for the various values of  and .
5.2 Individual consumer welfare
This part of the analysis is a bit more complicated. The purpose of this section is to see,
beyond the aggregate e¤ect of advertising, if in some cases, some agents lose while others
gain.
Let us start by investigating the case  6 00. In this case, no asymmetric equilibrium
can arise, and cases in which only one rm advertises musnt be taken into account.
Example 1 Let  = 3
4
. If both rms advertise, advertising targets are fb; ag =

0; 1
2
	
.
U00 (2 groups) = U
0
1 (2 groups) =  0:625, U00 (3 groups) = U01 (3 groups) = 150
  93  2p6.
With advertising, U20 =    11681 , meaning that the consumer located at the extreme left of
the continuum gains from advertising whatever the number of groups. On the other hand,
U21 =   18881 , meaning that the comsumer located at the extreme right of the continuum loses,
whatever the number of groups.
Example 2 Let  = 9
10
. In this case, advertising targets, if any, are fb; ag =

1
2
; 1
	
.
Given the modication in advertising targets, U20 =    18881 and U21 =    11681 , which means
that, for any number of groups, 0 loses and 1 gains from advertising.
Let us now consider what happens when  > 00. This means that no rm advertises,
one rm advertises fb; ag =

1
2
; ;	 or both rms advertise fb; ag = 12 ; 1	.
Example 3 Let  = 1. At equilibrium, it may be that no rm advertises, one rm advertises
(fb; ag =

1
2
; ;	) or both rms advertise (fb; ag = 12 ; 1	). In case of no advertising,
depending on the initial partition of the continuum, we have: U01 (2 groups) = U
0
1
2
(2 groups) =
 0:625, U01 (3 groups) = 1150
  93  2p6, U01
2
(3 groups) = 1
60
  7  8p6. If advertising
targets are fb; ag =

1
2
; ;	, then U11 = 130   9 p105 and U11
2
= 1
60
 
11  2p105. If
advertising targets are fb; ag =

1
2
; 1
	
, then U21 =  3581 and U21
2
=  257
324
. In the asymmetric
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equilibrium,  1
2
gains from advertising, while 1 may gain or lose, depending on the initial
partition. On the other hand, in a symmetric equilibrium in which both rms advertise,  1
2
loses but 1 gains.
This leads us to Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 Depending on the value of , the initial partitioning of the continuum [0; 1]
and the equilibrium chosen by rms, there are cases in which some consumers gain and others
lose.
The interpretation is that the result in terms of individual welfare depends on the distance
between the advertising and the agent, and the value of  which gives the taste for advertising,
as well as as the equilibrium chosen by rms, since this a¤ects the market price. The idea is
that for a given value of , some people will be hurt by advertising, because of the distance
between them and advertising, as well as by higher prices. Others, located close to the
advertising target, may gain from advertising, the positive e¤ect of advertising being higher
than the negative e¤ect on prices. Of course, with high values of , more people gain from
advertising, the converse being true for low values of .
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of social identity, a particular form of interpersonal
relationships, on the classical result of the Bertrand price competition model. We nd that
social identity has two major e¤ects: rst, the fact that people get utility if their type is
correctly understood by others, and under the constraint of a limited number of goods,
groups are formed, i.e. the continuum of agents is partitioned. Second, these interactions
create market power for rms, meaning higher prices and prots. Without any coordination
device, or in case of coordination failure, multiple equilibria will arise, each corresponding to a
particular partition. That is why we also consider the possibility for rms to use advertising.
This also generates two e¤ects: rst, advertising acts as a coordination device, making agents
of similar type consume the same good. Second, it may also increase prices and prots.
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We show that the equilibrium depends on the cost of advertising, as well as the taste for
advertising, that is, how much agents value it. In fact, which equilibrium arises depends on
the result of the combination of three e¤ects. Since we have two rms competing for the
market share, the rst e¤ect is what we call the competition e¤ect, which basically leads
rms to decrease their prices to win market shares. The way the continuum is divided into
subsets has an impact on this e¤ect, since it exposes rms more or less to competition. The
second e¤ect is created by advertising, and the fact that consumers value it. It is the market
stealing e¤ect, which allows a rm that advertises to steal market shares from the other rm,
thanks to the taste of consumers for advertising. Finally, the presence of social identity and
advertising decreases the price elasticity, leading to higher prices. This is the third e¤ect
that plays a role in determining which equilibrium arise.
For any value of taste for advertising, depending on its cost, there are situations in which
both rms advertise or no rm advertises. In addition, for given advertising costs, multiple
equilibria (for low values of the taste for advertising) and asymmetric equilibria (for high
values of the taste for advertising) may arise.
Finally, we investigate welfare implications. In terms of aggregate consumer welfare, it is
optimal that no rm advertises, one rm advertises or both rms advertise, depending on the
value of the taste for advertising. At the individual level, advertising is welfare increasing or
welfare decreasing depending on the initial partition of the continuum, the position on this
continuum, the cost of advertising and the taste for advertising.
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Appendices
A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 1
Proof. Let b = 0 and a = , and suppose there can be three groups. This means that there
are two indi¤erent consumers. Let us look at the indi¤erence condition for these consumers:
1 and 2.
i :   i  
Z
j2	(b)
j   ij d   pb =  
Z
j2	(a)
j   ij d   pa; i 2 f1; 2g
Taking the indi¤erent condition between the two goods for each consumer, and equaling
these two conditions (using the price vector) leads to:
(2   1) (1 + 2) = 0
which is not possible.
A.2 Lemma 2
Proof. Let b = 12 and a = .
Suppose we only have two groups, i.e. only one indi¤erent consumer, and that good b
consumers are located on the left of the continuum. Solving this case leads to
pb =
6 + 2
6
qb =
6 + 2
12
pa =
6  2
6
qa =
7  2
12
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However, in this situation, we have that
U0(b) =  
1
72
(  39)(  3)
U0(a) =
1
72
(  3)(+ 33)
meaning that
U0(a) > U0(b) 8 2 [0; 3)
meaning that the consumer on the extreme left has an incentive to deviate, soonly one
indi¤erent consumer cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that there are three groups. If both cuto¤s are located on the same side of the
advertising target, the equilibrium condition requires that 0 + 00 = 2, which is not possible.
If, on the other hand, these cuto¤s are on di¤erent sides, then theequilibrium condition
requires that 0 + 00 = 1, meaning that they have to be symmetric.
A.3 Lemma 4
Proof.
 Consider the case b = 0 and a = 1, and suppose there can be three groups. This
means that we have two indi¤erent consumers. Let us look at the indi¤erence condition
for these consumers: 1 and 2.
i :   i  
Z
j2	(b)
j   ij d   pb =   (1  i) 
Z
j2	(a)
j   ij d   pa; i 2 f1; 2g
Taking the indi¤erence condition between the two goods for each consumer, and equaling
these two conditions (using the price vector) leads to:
(2   1) (1 + 1 + 2) = 0
which is not possible.
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 Consider now one rm targeting an endpoint of the continuum, and the other rm
targeting the center. The existence of an equilibrium with only one indi¤erent consumer
(located between the two advertising targets) is shown in the text (see section 4.2).
Solving the problem with one indi¤erent consumer located after 1
2
leads to 1 < 12 , a
contradiction. With two indi¤erent consumers, there are three possible cases. If both
cuto¤s are located between the two targets, the equilibrium condition requires that
1 < 0 or 1 = 2, a contradiction. If both cuto¤s are located on the right of 12 , the
equilibrium condition requires that 1 = 1   2 or 1 = 2, a contradiction. If cuto¤s
are located on each side of 1
2
, the equilibrium condition requires that 1 > 12 and 2 >
1
2
.
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Part IV
Social Capital in Belgium
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1 Introduction
Tensions between the two major communities of Belgium have always existed. Recently, the
country has reached a sort of breakup point, where no one listens to anyone, and it seems
impossible to nd a way out. It is quite common to hear that the North and South of the
country are totally di¤erent, that there is no reason at all to keep them together. Although
some di¤erences do exist between the two communities, in particular in terms of culture (for
example, television shows, singers, actors, etc. are often di¤erent) and in lifestyle, it can not
be denied that they also share similarities. This paper does not intend to answer the long
and complex debate between separatists and non separatists. Its objective is to nd out if
there is a di¤erence in the levels of social capital between the regions of Belgium.
The concept of social capital, a very popular concept in economics, has been widely used
for about thirty years to explain various economic outcomes such as growth, development,
education, etc. Most of the related studies try to explain the di¤erences in outcomes between
di¤erent regions or countries by their di¤erence in social capital. In this paper, we limit
ourselves to describing what social capital is about in the particular case of Belgium.
The main results of the paper are the following: after building an index of social capital
based on various variables from the European Social Survey, we show that social capital
can be decomposed into three di¤erent aspects, namely, trust, social networks and social
activities. Using control variables, we show that there are not only di¤erences in the levels
of social capital of regions, but also in terms of composition of social capital between them.
Moreover, we put forward that education is important in the formation of social capital, as
well as in its di¤erent aspects. Finally, we extend the analysis to European countries. We nd
that European countries can be divided into three groups with respect to the level of social
capital: Western European countries, Eastern European countries and Northern European
countries. We also highlight that regional di¤erences exist in most countries, except in
Ireland, and that Switzerland has the highest regional di¤erences. Moreover, the level of
regional di¤erences in Belgium is higher than in Austria, The Netherlands and France, but
smaller than in Switzerland.
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we propose a short review of the literature
on the denition of social captal, as well as on the use of the concept. Section 3 presents
the data and the methodology used to measure and study social capital in Belgium. Section
4 contains the results of the analysis for Belgium, while section 5 investigates European
countries. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 What is Social Capital ?
The concept of social capital goes back to Loury (1977) and Coleman (1988). During the last
twenty years, many authors have used this concept to study various subjects, ranging from
economic growth to success in education. It is worth noting that there are many denitions,
so it is sometimes hard to know exactly what social capital really represents. Among all the
proposed denitions, here are some of the most often used:
Loury (1977) dened social capital as "social connections creating di¤erences in access
to opportunities for minority and non minority youth". Around ten years later, Coleman
(1988) described social capital as "a variety of entities with two elements in common: they
all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors".
Coleman put forward three possible aspects of social capital: obligations, expectations, and
trustworthiness of structures (for example trust that exists between sellers on the diamond
market), information channels (the netwok to which I belong helps me to get informed about,
for example, what is fashionable, and what is not), and norms and e¤ective sanctions (that
can be used to obtain good grades in high school, or decrease crime in some neighborhoods).
Granovetter (1973) put forward the role played by social networks to nd jobs. His theory
is based on what he calls the "strength of weak ties". The idea is that an agent may have
a number of close friends (strong ties) with whom he forms a dense network, all members
interacting with each other. On top of these strong ties, agents may also have less close
friends who are not connected to the other members of his dense network. These weak ties
may be helpful to the agent, in the sense that they allow him to be in touch with distant
networks, being then able to get information on various subjects, in particular job openings.
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Knack and Keefer (1997) dened social capital as trust and civic behavior (participa-
tion in elections, charity, helping others, etc.). In 2000, Putnam wrote the famous "Bowling
Alone", in which he describes social capital as taking part in activities and being members
of organizations. He also makes a distinction between "bonding social capital", which means
strenghtening the relationships inside a network, and "bridging social capital", meaning cre-
ating bridges between di¤erent networks thereby expanding the circle of reciprocity. Bowles
and Gintis (2002) dene social capital as being composed of "trust and a willingness to live
by the norms of ones community and to punish those who do not". Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2005) described it as referring to the community relations that a¤ect personal interactions.
Across all these denitions and many more, Durlauf and Fafchamps isolated a basic under-
lying mechanism common to most authors which works as follows: the existence of social
networks and associations leads to shared trust, norms and values, which in turn generate
positive externalities. In this paper, we do not restrict social capital to any denition in par-
ticular, but we rather create an index of social capital by selecting questions in the database,
each question instrumenting one or more elements used to describe social capital (such as
trust, norms, network, civic behavior, participation in activities).
Following Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), empirical studies can be classied into two cat-
egories: individual-level studies and aggregate studies. As far as individual-level studies are
concerned, these can also be divided into two: those related to development (immigration,
reduction of poverty, land development, trader protability, etc.), and those focussing on
OECD countries (mental health, dropping out of high school, criminal activity, etc.). Ag-
gregate studies mainly deal with growth. On top of all these studies, some also investigate
the determinants of social capital such as watching TV, neighborhood homogeneity, female
labor force participation, neighborhood benets, etc. The idea is to determine what kind of
factors impact the formation of social capital.
Our goal in this paper is to study social capital in Belgium, more precisely, to nd out
if there exists a di¤erence in the levels of social capital between the regions of the country.
Such a regional investigation has already been performed by some authors: Helliwell and
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Putnam (1995), for example, explain the more rapid growth of Northern Italy relative to
Southern Italy because of di¤erences in social capital measured by group membership and
civic participation. Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2001) show that social capital, measured
by generalized trust and associational activity is positively related to growth di¤erentials in
European regions. Van Oorschot et al. (2006) describe how social capital, by its various
aspects, is distributed geographically among European countries and regions (North, West,
South and East). They nd some di¤erences between countries and regions, although those
di¤erences are not very large, except for Northern European countries.
3 Measuring Social Capital
The data we use in this paper comes from the European Social Survey. There have already
been three waves of this survey, carried out respectively in 2001-2002, 2003-2004 and 2005-
2006. In the last wave, the database covers more than 20 countries, contains more than 150
questions on 43000 observations. The data concern various subjects such as political life,
social life, family, employment, health, etc. Given that new questions are added in each
wave, and that three periods is not enough to use panel data techniques, we will focus on
the last wave, which contains questions allowing us to create a more precise index of social
capital.
To measure social capital, we select various variables, each one instrumenting one or more
aspects of social capital as dened earlier. The chosen variables are given here under. Each
time, the coding of the variable follows the name of the variable.
 Most people can be trusted or you cant be too careful (TRUST), [from 0 to 10; 0: you
have to be careful, 10: most people can be trusted]
The reason why we chose this rst variable is quite obvious: trust is one of the aspects
of social capital which is most put forward. Trust was popularized by Fukuyama (1999)
and is the most commonly used empirical measure of social capital (Fidrmuc, 2008); this is
probably due to its availability in many databases. The main idea of this aspect is that the
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more people trust each other, the more e¢ cient economic outcomes will be. For example, two
traders who trust each other will spend less time and money writing contracts (remember in
particular the example of the diamond traders). Another example of the positive e¤ect of
trust is that a community inside which trust is high does not have to spend money on the
surveillance of its membersactions. Note that trust can be understood as generalized trust,
when this concerns the whole population (of a club or a network), and personalized trust,
when it is specic to some specic agents who, for example, interact repeatedly.
The second variable we use is
 Involved in work for voluntary or charitable organizations, how often during the past
12 months (CHARITY), [from 1 to 6; 1: never, 2: less than once every six months, 3:
at least once every six months, 4: at least once every three months, 5: at least once a
month, 6: at least once a week]
The main goal of this variable is to instrument civic behavior. This aspect is seen as also
having a positive impact on economic outcomes. Someone involved in charitable activities is
expected to behave in the same way on various subjects, such as tax payment, participation
in elections, etc. The link to social capital appears in the fact that such behavior can take
place either because there is a norm of civic behavior (see for example Knack and Keefer,
1997), because you are expecting others to behave in the same way if you need it one day
(idea of reciprocity), or simply because of altruism, which is also sometimes seen as social
capital because you care about other members of the community.
The third variable is
 Most people try to take advantage of you or try to be fair (FAIR), [from 0 to 10; 0:
most people try to take advantage of me, 10: most people try to be fair]
The idea here is close to that of the two rst variables. Fairness can be seen as way
to improve economic outcomes, by lowering costs (if I believe others will trade with me
in a fair way, then contracts do not have to be long, complicated and expensive). In this
sense, fairness plays the same role as trust. On the other hand, fairness is also linked to
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civic behavior. Indeed, one can consider fairness as a behavior arising inside a well-dened
community, because of reciprocity for example.
The fourth variable is
 Help or attend activities organized in local area, how often during the past 12 months
(LOCAL ACTIVITIES), [from 1 to 6; 1: never, 2: less than once every six months, 3:
at least once every six months, 4: at least once every three months, 5: at least once a
month, 6: at least once a week]
This variable can also be seen as a proxy for civic behavior depending on the type of
activities (note here that since these questions come from a large survey, and since questions
are not necessarily precise, respondents may have various interpretations). Another possibil-
ity is that agents participate in such activities in order to build a network, either with weak
or strong ties, in order to be able to achieve a given goal. In that sense, this variable is more
related to the network aspect of social capital.
This fth variable is
 There are people in my life who care about me (PEOPLE CARE), [from 1 to 5; 1:
Disagree strongly, 5: Agree strongly]
Here, we focus on the strong ties, that is the dense and potentially close network around
an individual. As already said, this kind of network is the best place to ensure that norms
will be sustained. It is also a way for agents to use their connections to reach goals (although
weak ties can also ll this role as explained by Granovetter) as well as the place in which
trust between members is the most likely to arise.
The sixth variable is
 How often do you socially meet with friends, relatives, or colleagues (SOCIAL MEET-
ING), [from 0 to 7; 0: never, 7: every day]
The idea here is the same as above, except that this question does not necessarily focus
on very close agents, but allows for more distant friends and colleagues. Hence, both strong
and weak ties are supposed to be instrumented by this question.
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Finally, the last one is
 Take part in social activities compared to others of same age (SOCIAL ACTIVITIES),
[from 0 to 5: 0: much less than most, 5: much more than most]
The idea is that taking part in social activities is clearly a way for agents to get into a
network which can be used to achieve their goal, but it is also a way to pursue a common
goal with other people.
From these seven variables, we create an index of social capital using principal component
analysis1. This will not only allow us to have a single variable to measure social capital, but
it will also help us to analyze various aspects of social capital.
3.1 Methodology
We use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop our index of social capital. More
precisely, we take all variables related to one or more aspects of social capital and use data
reduction to compute our index. The idea is to reduce the number of variables by creating new
ones containing enough information to characterize social capital. Let X be an N individuals
 P variables matrix and X be the matrix of centered and reduced data such that
xip =
xip   xp
sp
8i 2 f1; :::; Ng 8p 2 f1; :::; Pg
where xp and sp are respectively the mean and the standard deviation of variable p. Let @
be the representation of the N individuals in a P dimensional space (@ = fI1 ; :::; INg). The
rst component is obtained in the following way: we determine the straight line 1 such that
I(@;1) = min
 passing through O
I(@;)
1Even if none of the variables we use are continuous, they are all ordered and have multiple modalities.
Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we use principal component analysis instead of multiple correspondence
analysis.
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with
I(@;1) = 1
n
NX
i=1
d2(Ii ; P1(I

i ))
where P1(I

i ) is the orthogonal projection of I

i on 1. Let
u1 = (u1;1; :::; u1;P )
0
be the unit vector generating 1. The coordinate of individual i on the rst component is
then given by
i1 =
PX
p=1
u1;px

ip
Other components are computed using the same procedure, with the additional constraint
that principal components are orthogonal to each other. The number of principal components
we use depends on the percentage of the variance explained by the h rst components.
In other words, the goal is to reduce the number of dimensions, by creating new variables
that are uncorrelated with each other and constructed as a linear combination of the "old"
ones. The results are then more easily obtained and interpreted, while being careful to keep
enough information in the data to retain some explanatory power.
3.2 Index of social capital
Taking the seven variables (after centering and reducing them) presented above, and per-
forming PCA leads to
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Table I: PCA
1 2 3
TRUST 0.532 0.671 -0.146
FAIR 0.474 0.722 -0.113
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES 0.683 -0.295 0.021
CHARITY 0.579 -0.330 -0.342
LOCAL ACTIVITIES 0.590 -0.392 -0.296
SOCIAL MEETING 0.504 -0.192 0.478
PEOPLE CARE 0.337 0.067 0.737
These three components (whose eigenvalues are above 12) explain together almost 65% of
the variance. Although this may not appear to be very good, it is not too bad, since the seven
original variables (before performing PCA) are not highly correlated (75% of the correlations
are below 20%). The rst component (1) is our index of social capital. It can be interpreted
as the level of social capital of each individual since it is positively correlated with all aspects
of social capital. This means that as soon as one variable among the seven increases, the
component, that is the level of social capital, increases. Though this new variable will be
very helpful to investigate the di¤erences in social capital between regions of the country as
well as studying the role of various socioeconomic factors in the formation of social capital,
it does not allow us to disentangle the di¤erent aspects of social capital that may be present.
This is possible with the two other components. 2 opposes TRUST and FAIR with all
others, which means that FAIR is considered to be similar to TRUST by people. Hence, we
call these two variables by the same name i.e. trust oriented social capital: for a given level
of 1 and 3, an observation with a higher coordinate on 2 has a more trust oriented social
capital. The third component, 3, opposes SOCIAL MEETING and PEOPLE CARE to the
ve other variables. Given the di¤erent possible explanations given above, one can interpret
2This cuto¤ comes from the fact that the mean of the eigenvalues (of the correlation matrix) is one, each of
the eigenvalues giving the inertia of the corresponding component (the share of the total variance explained
by each component is given by the eigenvalue corresponding to the component divided by the sum of all
eigenvalues). Hence, taking components whose eigenvalues are larger than one guarantees that we retain
enough information.
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these two variables as being the social networks side of social capital. The idea is here that if
you often meet friends, colleagues, family and the like, and if you have people who care about
you, you have a lot of ties (both strong and weak) that can be used in purposive actions.
As a consequence, the last three variables, SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, CHARITY, and LOCAL
ACTIVITIES can be put together. We call them the social activities side of social capital.
The underlying idea is that someone who is involved in these activities (sports clubs, religious
organizations, youth groups, political parties, charities, etc.) binds with other people and is
then able to pursue common goals with them, with or without exerting externalities on the
rest of society. We want to outline that social activities and social networks are obviously
very close to each other. In particular, participating in social activities often means building
a network, while being part of a social network is often synonymous of taking part in social
activities. However, given the way questions were asked in the survey, our classication takes
into account that the social networks are more people (and hence links) oriented, while the
other one is more activities oriented. The distinction we made between more individual
purpose in social networks versus common action in social activities follows also from the
question of the survey, even if again, the distinction may not be perfectly clear. Given the
presence of CHARITY and LOCAL ACTIVITIES, we assume that it is more common goal-
oriented. It is important to underline that this distinction between aspects of social capital
is very close to di¤erent analyses found in the literature (see for example Paldam (2000) who
decomposes social capital into trust, ease of cooperation and network, or van Oorschot et al.
(2006) who also consider three aspects, namely trust, networks and civism).
So far, starting from several variables, we constructed an index of social capital for Bel-
gium, while disantangling three aspects, i.e. trust, social activities and social network, as
well as the distinction between common goals versus individual objectives.
4 Belgians Regional Di¤erences in Social Capital
Let us rst look at some descriptive statistics. The following table gives the number of
observations, the mean, maximum and minimum values, as well as the standard deviation
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for the three components, for the whole country as well as for the regions.
Table II: Descriptive statistics
Component Region N Mean Max Min Std.deviation
1 All 1788 0.01 6.14 -6.53 2.03
Flanders 1123 0.2 6.14 -6.02 2.01
Brussels 98 0.02 5.33 -4.51 2.12
Wallonia 567 -0.38 5.19 -6.53 2.03
2 All 1788 0.01 3.80 -5.19 1.37
Flanders 1123 0.18 3.80 -4.20 1.31
Brussels 98 -0.28 2.56 -3.91 1.44
Wallonia 567 -0.31 2.87 -5.19 1.39
3 All 1788 0.01 2.21 -4.75 1.02
Flanders 1123 0.05 2.21 -4.75 0.96
Brussels 98 -0.03 1.65 -2.39 1.01
Wallonia 567 -0.09 2.08 -3.94 1.11
Let us briey comment these results: concerning the rst component (our index of social
capital), the Flemish region has the highest mean, and Walloon region the lowest. The
maximum value can be found in the Flemish region, while the minimum is in Wallonia. For
the second and third components (trust aspect and social networks aspect of social capital),
it is still the Flemish region whose mean is the highest and Wallonias which is the lowest.
To test the equality of means between the three regions, we rst perform a general ANOVA
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test of equality of means on all three regions simultaneously (H0 = equality of means).
Table III: ANOVA
Mean Square F P value
1 62.61 15.388 0.000
2 50.13 27.641 0.000
3 3.9 3.782 0.023
This table shows that we reject the null hypothesis of equality of means3 ;4. In others words,
the mean population of each component is not the same accross regions. To be a bit more
precise, we now run a t-test on means, taking regions two by two. Results are given in Table
IV.
Table IV: t-test on means
H0 Mean di¤erence Std. error di¤erence P value
1 FL=BR 0.18 0.21 0.401
FL=W 0.58 0.10 0.000
BR=W 0.4 0.22 0.075
2 FL=BR 0.47 0.14 0.001
FL=W 0.49 0.07 0.000
BR=W 0.03 0.15 0.855
3 FL=BR 0.09 0.10 0.395
FL=W 0.14 0.05 0.007
BR=W 0.06 0.12 0.642
Table IV gives some interesting results. Concerning our index of social capital, it appears
that the means of Flanders and Brussels are not statistically di¤erent, while Wallonias is
lower. For the trust aspect of social capital, it is Brussels and Wallonia which are now
not statistically di¤erent, while Flanders is higher. Finally, only Flanders and Wallonia are
3At a 5% signicance level (probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true)
4Runing the ANOVA test requires to have both the normality of the data and equality of variances between
regions assumptions fullled. This is true for the two rst components. For the third, however, variances are
not equal. Hence, the result cannot really be interpreted for the third component
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statistically di¤erent with respect to the third component.
Until now, we have only looked at the data in a descriptive way. However, the character-
istics of each region could be di¤erent, which would of course have an impact on the results
of potential regional di¤erences. For example, the regional di¤erences in social capital may
come from the fact that one region is more educated than another, and not because of social
capital itself. We must control for this.
To do this, we now regress 1 on various variables. The variables are the following: Born
in country (takes value 1 if yes, 2 if no), Gender (1 if male, 2 if female), Age, Level of
education, and dummies for each Region. The three rst variables take into account intrinsic
characteristics of individuals. The variable education is often studied together with social
capital. However, this variable may be endogenous. Indeed, if it is easy to imagine that the
education received has an impact on the networks one belongs to and on the activities one
participates in, the reverse causality is also quite intuitive. Being part of specic networks
or organizations may a¤ect educational achievements of individuals. If such endogeneity
exists, then estimations will be biased, leading to false conclusions. To avoid this, we use
instrumental variables i.e. we search for variables which are correlated with education but
uncorrelated with the error term of the social capital equation, which allows us to use them
as instruments for education. In the database, we have two variables which can play this
role: education of the father and education of the mother. Literature on education states that
education of the parents is usually a good indicator of the education of the children. On top
of this, these two variables cannot be endogenous. Indeed, if the education of the parents may
have an impact on the social capital of the child, the reverse is clearly not possible. Hence,
these two variables seem to be two potential instruments. One must be aware however of the
fact that education of the father and education of the mother may be correlated, meaning
that they contain the same information. Moreover, good instruments should not be correlated
with social capital. Hence, when needed, we may use a self-computed third variable which is
the gap between education of the father and education of the mother (this can be interpreted
as an incentive for a child to get educated when observing a di¤erence between the education
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levels of his parents).
We run a two stage least squares (2SLS) regression to analyze social capital, using instru-
ments for education. Each time, we run several tests to check the validity and the quality of
the instruments. The results are given in Table V.
Table V: Determinants of Social Capital in Belgium (2SLS)
Social capital Coef. Std. Err.
Born in country -0.3198* 0.1721
Gender -0.1101 0.0971
Age -0.0073** 0.0029
Education 0.3397*** 0.1287
Education of the mother 0.1789*** 0.0557
Brussels 0.0467 0.2259
Flanders 0.6126*** 0.1046
Cons. -0.9727** 0.4738
R-squared: 0.1351
instruments: Education of the father, gap
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
In order to avoid endogeneity, since education of the mother is correlated with social
capital (even when controlling for education) and since tests indicate that it is redundant
with education of the father, education is instrumented by education of the father and gap
(remember that gap is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the levels of education
of the parents). Both are signicantly and positively correlated with education in the rst
stage of the 2SLS, and are good instruments as conrmed by the tests5. We now take a
closer look at the results. First, with Wallonia as the control group, Brussels is not di¤erent
from zero, meaning that the level of social capital in that region is the same as the level in
Wallonia for people of the same age, gender, nationality and education. This contradicts the
previous result obtained by t-tests. The reason is that we use various control variables here,
which means that some factors other than regions have a¤ected the previous result. On the
5For this regression, as well as for all the next ones, we run three tests: the rst two check the weakness
of the instruments (one checks if there is at least one good instrument for each endogenous variable, and the
other one checks if both instruments are good in the sense that they reduce the bias created by 2SLS with
respect to the bias arising from endogeneity problems su¢ ciently). The third one checks the exogeneity of
instruments with respect to the error term of the social capital equation.
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contrary, Flanders is signicantly di¤erent from zero, meaning that there is a di¤erence in
the level of social capital between Wallonia and Flanders. More precisely, the results indicate
that the level of social capital is higher in the North of the country than in the South.
Concerning the other variables, there seems to be a kind of discrimination in terms of social
capital: someone who is born in the country has a higher level of social capital than someone
who is not. This may be linked to fewer social activities, but also to fewer social networks.
Gender plays no role in the level of social capital, but age does. Indeed, age appears to be
negatively correlated with the level of social capital i.e. younger people seem to have more
time to be involved in activities and creating network than older ones. Finally, education and
education of the mother are signicant. Both variables are positively correlated with social
capital which means that education of the mother has an impact on social capital of the child
not only through an indirect e¤ect (education), but also through a direct one.
Since there seems to be di¤erences in the levels of social capital between some regions, one
can wonder if the e¤ect of the various variables changes depending on the region considered.
To investigate this possibility, we look at 1 by region. However, due to a problem in nding
good instruments for Brussels, given that the ones we used up to now are not good for this
region alone, we limit our study to the two other regions.
Table VI: Social Capital in Flanders and Wallonia
Social capital Flanders Wallonia
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Born in country -0.2429 0.2433 -0.3927 0.2841
Gender -0.097 0.1206 -0.1089 0.1803
Age -0.0064 0.004 -0.0135** 0.0056
Education 0.2903* 0.1615 0.5778** 0.2501
Education of the mother 0.1701*** 0.643 0.0851 0.1227
Cons. -0.3253 0.6136 -1.1868 0.8374
R-squared: 0.1054 0.0978
instruments: Education of the father, gap
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The level of education is signicant and positively correlated with social capital in both
regions, which indicates that this variable is very important in the formation of social capital.
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Education of the mother is signicant only in Flanders. Gender and country of birth are not
signicant, while age is signicant only in Wallonia, and has the same sign as in the global
study just above.
Another interesting question is to nd out to what extent the results change when studying
each aspect of social capital taken separately. To answer this, we rst need to create an index
of each aspect of social capital. Using PCA on the orignal variables of each aspect, we obtain
the results reported in Table VII.
Table VII: PCA on each aspect
TRUST ACTIVITIES NETWORKS
TRUST 0.869
FAIR 0.869
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES 0.733
CHARITY 0.746
LOCAL ACTIVITIES 0.751
SOCIAL MEETING 0.760
PEOPLE CARE 0.760
Share of variance explained 75.54% 55.26% 57.685%
Using these results, we construct an index for each aspect of social capital, and then we
use 2SLS on each aspect.
There does not seem to be a discrimination concerning the various aspects of social
capital, except for activities, which means that it is only the participation to various kinds of
activities which is a¤ected by the place invidividuals are born, not the trust or the belonging
to networks. Similarly, gender is signicant only in explaining the social activities aspect:
being a woman a¤ects the social activities aspect of social capital negatively. The variable
age is signicant for all aspects, but its sign changes depending on the aspect. Younger
people seem to have more social activities and social networks than older ones, while the
converse is true for the trust aspect. Education and education of the mother are signicant
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Table VIII: Determinants of social capital by aspects
Social capital Trust Activities Networks
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Born in country -0.0509 0.1345 -0.2983** 0.1377 -0.1179 0.1131
Gender 0.0041 0.0737 -0.1876** 0.0809 0.0811 0.0582
Age 0.0046* 0.0022 -0.0062** 0.0025 -0.0066*** 0.0018
Education 0.1739* 0.0973 0.2001* 0.1064 0.1278* 0.0749
Education of the mother 0.1243*** 0.0425 0.0818* 0.0473 0.0618** 0.0319
Brussels 0.0957 0.1672 0.0322 0.1885 -0.0507 0.1398
Flanders 0.6396*** 0.0794 0.0967 0.0867 0.3188*** 0.0675
Cons. -1.3552*** 0.3535 0.0197 0.3858 -0.4081 0.2821
R-squarred: 0.0934 0.082 0.0405
instruments: Education of the father, gap
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
and positive for all aspects, which means that these two variables are really important for
all aspects of social capital. Finally, there does not seem to be a regional di¤erence in terms
of social activities, while Flanders seems to be higher than the two other regions in terms of
trust and social networks6.
5 Regional di¤erences in Europe?
Up to now we limited our analysis to Belgium. One can wonder if the regional di¤erences
that appear in Belgium also exist in other European countries. To check this, we again
have to compute an index of social capital, but this time for 23 countries: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, the UK,
Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Sweden and Ukraine. Taking the seven variables used above to proxy social capital, we reduce
6We also regressed each of the seven original variables used to compute the indexes on the various socioe-
conomic variables. The results we found are in line with the ones concerning each aspect of social capital.
More precisely, education is always signicant, and there exist almost the same regional di¤erences (there is
only a di¤erence for the social activities aspect of social capital: charity is more present in Flanders, while
local activities are more present in Wallonia).
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the dimensions using principal component analysis. The results are given in Table IX below.
Table IX: PCA for European countries
1 2 3
TRUST 0.631 -0.598 -0.147
FAIR 0.617 -0.620 -0.131
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES 0.554 0.321 0.388
CHARITY 0.583 0.438 -0.408
LOCAL ACTIVITIES 0.565 0.456 -0.421
SOCIAL MEETING 0.487 0.191 0.589
PEOPLE CARE 0.310 -0.075 0.472
The two rst components keep the same interpretation as above. The third one is slightly
di¤erent, since SOCIAL ACTIVITIES are now coupled with SOCIAL MEETING and PEO-
PLE. In this case, besides the trust aspect, we then have a network aspect, composed of these
three variables, and a civic behavior aspect, formed by the last two variables. We concentrate
our analysis rst on the rst two components, namely social capital and the trust aspect of
social capital, and compute the average of both component for each country. The choice of
the second component instead of the third is justied by the fact that trust is the most often
used measure of social capital. Figure I below presents the results.
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Figure I: Social Capital in Europe
The horizontal axis gives the level of social capital, and the vertical axis presents a
measure of trust versus other aspects of social capital (the smaller the value, the higher
trust versus other aspects). We immediately see three groups of countries arising: Northern
countries, Eastern European countries and Western European countries. Northern countries
exhibit levels of social capital among the highest. It is also more trust oriented than in
Western European countries. Eastern European countries have lower social capital. Three
particular cases: Estonia, which has a more trust-oriented social capital than the other
Eastern European countries, and Portugal and Cyprus whose social capital proles are closer
to those of Eastern countries.
In order to study regional di¤erences in Europe, with the objective of comparing them
with Belgium, we restrict the sample to similar countries in terms social capital prole, that
is, to Western European countries, with the exception of Portugal and Cyprus, because of
their prole, as well as the UK and Germany, because of a lack of good instruments. For
similar endogeneity problems as those described above, we use two stage least squares (2SLS),
with education instrumented by the education of both parents, or education of one of the
parents and the gap between their education. In order to be able to compare countries, we
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need to express these coe¢ cients in terms of elasticity. The results are given in Table X
below.
Table X: Determinants of social capital in Europe
Social capital Austria Belgium Switzerland Spain France Ireland Netherland
Education 0.0085 0.0329*** 0.0504*** 0.0302*** 0.0264*** 0.0272* 0.0381***
[0.0106] [0.0125] [0.0086] [0.0061] [0.0104] [0.0157] [0.0081]
Born in country -0.0477*** -0.0307* -0.0359*** -0.0469*** -0.0359** -0.0577*** -0.0573***
[0.0174] [0.0166] [0.0103] [1.0162] [0.0146] [0.0165] [0.0138]
Gender -0.0059 -0.0104 0.0466* -0.004 -0.0043 -0.0111 0.021**
[0.0091] [0.0094] [0.009] [0.0075] [0.0088] [0.0106] [0.0084]
Age -0.0017*** -0.0006** -0.0009*** -0.0003 0.0011*** 0.0019*** 0
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003]
Education of the mother 0.0174*** 0.0121** 0.153**
[0.0054] [0.0055] [0.0068]
Regions Karnten Brussels Espace Mittelland North Est de Paris Border, Midlands and West East
0.0344 -0.0575*** 0.0251* 0.0574*** 0.0053 0.0242 -0.0112
[0.0288] [0.0211] [0.0137] [0.0159] [0.02] [0.0169] [0.0151]
Niederösterreich Walloon Nordswestchweiz Madrid Ouest de Paris Southern and Eastern West
0.0405* -0.0625*** 0.041*** -0.0094 -0.0282 0.0127 -0.0155
[0.0236] [0.0099] [0.0159] [0.0163] [0.0207] [0.0148] [0.0133]
Oberösterreich Zürich West Nord South
0.0469** 0.0051 0.0263* -0.0181 -0.0303**
[0.0241] [0.0135] [0.0157] [0.0199] [0.015]
Salzburg Ostschweiz East Est
0.0279 0.0236 0.0173 -0.0026
[0.0272] [0.0149] [0.014] [0.0204]
Steiermark Zentralschweiz South Ouest
0.0282 0.0498*** 0.0264** 0.0308*
[0.0253] [0.0186] [0.0149] [0.0183]
Tirol Ticino Canarias Sud Ouest
0.0233 -0.0394* 0.0311 0.0015
[0.0254] [0.0235] [0.0232] [0.0173]
Vorarlberg Sud Est
0.0315 0.0001
[0.0344] [0.0177]
Wien Méditerranée
0.0022 -0.0036
[0.0252] [0.0188]
Control Region Burgenland Flemish Lémanique North West Paris Dublin North
Predicted ks 10.5022 10.2462 10.8306 10.198 10.2911 10.3916 11.1453
R-squared 0.0424 0.1351 0.0668 0.0866 0.096 0.0689 0.0785
Std. Errors between brackets
* signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
All countries have some regional di¤erences, except Ireland. The di¤erences range from
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3% to 9%7, depending on the country. In the Netherlands, being in the South implies having
3% less social capital. In France and Austria, most regions do not have any signicant
di¤erences, except for the West of France (3% more social capital than the control region)
and the North of Austria (about 4% more than the control region). There seems to be more
variance in Switzerland, where one region exhibit almost 4% less social capital while another
has 5% more social capital than the control region. In Spain, three regions have a higher
level of social capital than the control region. One of these regions has almost 6% more social
capital than the control region, which is similar to the di¤erences that exist in Belgium.
6 Conclusion
We rst built an index of social capital, which is composed of three aspects. The rst
measures trust, one of the most current measure of social capital. The second aspect is social
activities, which represents the fact that agents get together in order to achieve a common
goal. The last one is social networks, which can be used by agents in purposive actions. By
running simple t-tests, we showed, among other things, that the level of social capital is the
same in Flanders and in Brussels, but di¤erent in Wallonia.
In a second step, we study these regional di¤erences more in detail. Using several control
variables, we show that education is really important in terms of formation of social capital,
and that there do indeed exist regional di¤erences: Brussels and Wallonia do not show a
signicant di¤erence in the level of social capital, but Flanders has more social capital that
the two other regions. We also study social capital in each region, and investigate each aspect
of social capital separately. For the latter, we highlight that education is important for all
aspects, and that regional di¤erences exist, except for social activities.
Finally, we look at regional di¤erences at the European level. In terms of levels of social
capital, three groups of countries appear, namely Northern countries, Eastern European
countries and Western European countries. We nd that regional di¤erences exist in most
7Note that in case of dummy variables, interpreting the coe¢ cients in terms of elasticities requires the
following transformation: e   1. However, given the values of the original coe¢ cients, the transformation
changes almost nothing, so we do not take this into account.
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countries, except in Ireland, and that Switzerland has the highest regional di¤erences. France,
Austria and The Netherlands have more or less the same prole, i.e. only a few regions have
regional di¤erences in the levels of social capital, and these di¤erences range from 3% to 5%
with respet to the control region. Moreover, the level of regional di¤erences in Belgium is
higher than in Austria, The Netherlands and France, but smaller than in Switzerland.
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